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PATENT LAW: DOCTRINAL STABILITY-
A RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DEFINITION OF
INVENTION IS KEY
INTRODUCTION
In 1982, the Congress of the United States created the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC primarily as a single and
expert court for the appeal of patent cases.2 In addition, Congress
issued this new court a mandate to develop and increase doctrinal
stability in the patent law area The creation of this court with such
a mandate was a direct response to continued uncertainty and in-
stability in patent law.4 Such uncertainty and instability meant that
patent law was not effectively fulfilling its purpose in society.
The purpose of patent law is to promote progress in science and
technology.' The area of society that deals with progress in science
1. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, S 101, 28 U.S.C. S 41 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982].
2. See S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 11, 15 (hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 275).
3. Id.
4. Report of Commission on Revision of the Federal Courts Appellate System,
67 F.R.D. 195, 297, 321 (1976). See also H.R. 4482, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC.
H737 (1982); S. REP. No. 275, supra note 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 15-16. The uncertainty and instability referred to here had existed in patent
law for some time. In 1980, a major conference was held to commemorate the 30th
anniversary of 35 U.S.C. S 103 and to address the uncertainty that had surrounded
its application since enactment. As a result of the conference, a collection of articles
attempting to clarify S 103 were published in BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
NONOBVIOUSNESS -THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (J. Witherspoon ed. 1980)
(hereinafter cited as BNA, NONOBVIOUSNESS). The foreword to this book was by then
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, D.W. Banner. See Id. at v. In this foreword,
he points out that the hopes of many had not been realized in having S 103 serve
as a clear congressional directive in patent law (emphasis added). He then indicated
that inventors and businessmen would be interested in the patent system only so long
as they can reasonably understand the patent laws and reasonably rely on their stability
(emphasis added). He also added, that when the government grant of a patent cannot
reasonably be relied upon, the patent system becomes a cruel hoax, resulting in in-
creased secrecy and in a decrease in innovation. Id. The uncertainty and instability
the Commissioner addressed here in 1980, is of course the same uncertainty and in-
stability that two years later led to the creation of the CAFC.
5. This purpose of patent law is expressly stated in the patent and copyright
clause of the Constitution of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8. This
clause gives Congress the power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts." Id.
Nguti: Patent Law:  Doctrinal Stability - A Research and Development Def
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1986
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
and technology involves the discovery of scientific knowledge and
technical know-how, as well as the development of products and pro-
cesses that are conceptually new.' Today, this area is represented by
organized research and development (R&D).7 Patent law in one respect
is therefore an attempt through the use of words to influence and
structure (the concepts and realities of) human behavior in R&D.8 In
order therefore to rid patent law of uncertainty and the instability
uncertainty brings, it is essential that those charged with applying
patent law understand the concepts and realities that patent law at-
tempts to structure. The same is also true of those whose behavior
patent law seeks to influence. Furthermore, it is essential that the
concepts and realities reflected by the words of patent law actually
be from the area of society represented by R&D. Without these essen-
tials, patent law cannot effectively accomplish its purpose of promoting
progress in science and technology through R&D.'
For this purpose of promoting progress in science and technology,
United States patent law authorizes and directs the government to
grant certain exclusive rights to inventors for their inventions.'0 The
6. See generally Schmitt, National R&D Policy: An Industrial Perspective, 224
SCIENCE 1206 (1984). See also E. MANSFIELD, INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1 (1968).
7. See, e.g., L. SILK. THE RESEARCH REVOLUTION 3-4 (1960). See also J. KEN.
NETH GALBRAITH, THE INDUSTRIAL STATE 12-13, 19-20, 33n (1978); infra note 33
and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Stroup, Law and Language: Cardozo's Jurisprudence and Witt-
genstein's Philosophy, 18 VAL. U.L. REV. 331 (1984). Stroup's comment here is in terms
of law generally, thus, thus it is also true of patent law.
9. Id. at 356. Here Stroup argues that to be effective, law must be founded
on actual forces. This means that its words and operative concepts must be based
on and deal with the tangibles and realities of society. In addition, those applying
the law must clearly understand this relationship between the words of the law and
societal realities. This is necessary in order to avoid uncertainties in applying the
law to such realities.
10. United States patent law is strictly federal law. It is made up of the pa-
tent and copyright clause of the Constitution, the patent act in force and judicial doc-
trines that have evolved over the last 195 years of patent law history.
The patent and copyright clause of the Constitution of the United States, directly
incorporates the concept of invention into the Constitution. See infra note 84. However,
the United States Congress in enacting patent acts pursuant to this clause, has used
but never successfully defined the term invention. For unsuccessful efforts by Con-
gress see THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY. 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A STATUTORY STAN-
DARD OF INVENTION (Comm. Print 1958) thereinafter cited as EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A
STATUTORY STANDARD OF INVENTION]. In fact under the current Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.
S 1-376 (1982), the sections that deal with the question of what is and what is not
patentable, use the concept of invention 115 times, but without a definition.
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current Patent Act" expressly directs the government through its
agencies, to grant patents'2 for inventions that are new,13 useful 4 and
nonobvious."5 The responsibility of determining whether an applica-
tion for a patent satisfies these requirements of the Patent Act belongs
to the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).'" Final determination by
the PTO is reviewable by the Federal courts, 7 if necessary. Deter-
mination by the PTO and any review by the federal courts, turn prin-
cipally on the concept of invention as it is used in patent law.'8 Unfor-
Because Congress has never defined the term invention, defining invention has
therefore been left to the courts. This note focuses only on the efforts of the Supreme
Court of the United States, and those (although none so far) of the newly created
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The focus is limited to these courts because
their definitions currently will have precedential value. See infra notes 62, 206-208
and accompanying text.
11. 35 U.S.C. SS 1-376 (1982).
12. Patents are instruments issued under United States Government seal cover-
ing particular subject matters. Each patent defines and limits the particular subject
matter which it covers. Each gives to the patentee the right to exclude others by
due process of law from making, using or selling the subject matter covered. This
right is good within the United States and its territories. 35 U.S.C. S 154 (1982). See,
e.g., Ramsey, The Historical Background of Patents , 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 6, 19 (1936);
Williams, The Rights Conferred by Letters Patent for Inventions, 8 VA. L. REv. 507, 509
(1922). For a description of the patent instrument itself see 35 U.S.C. S 154 (1982).
13. 35 U.S.C. S 102 (1982).
14. Id. S 101.
15. Id. § 103.
16. The Patent and Trademark Office is a United States Government agency.
It is headed by a commissioner and is presently part of the United States Department
of Commerce. The PTO, as it is generally called, is responsible for processing applica-
tions for patents. It receives applications for patents, examines them for compliance
with patent law, and decides whether or not to grant or refuse the patent sought
by each application. The PTO has had the power to reject applications since its crea-
tion in 1836. See Patent Act of 1836 S 1, 5 Stat. 117 (1836-1845).
17. See infra note 62.
18. The patent and copyright clause of the Constitution requires that [patents]
be granted to inventors for their discoveries. The use of the term inventor directly
incorporates the concept of invention. See supra note 83. The granting of patents is
therefore constitutionally tied to the concept of invention-especially when the in-
herent and empirical relationship between inventions and discoveries is recognized. See
inf'ra note 44.
The constitutional connection between the grant of patents and inventions was
recognized in Great A. & P. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155 (1950)
(Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas stated that "[tihe standard of patentability
is a constitutional standard." He further stated that where the validity of a patent
is in issue, the standard of invention will control, and that the question of invention
actually goes back to the constitution. Id. at 156.
This reading of the constitution in Great A.& P. is still good law despite at-
tempts under § 103 Nonobviousness to ignore, abandon or eliminate the question of
invention and references to it. See, e.g., Graham v. Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (decided
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tunately however, patent law has been unsuccessful in developing an
objective and realistic definition of invention. 9 This lack of a defini-
tion for so principal a concept in patent law, has been at the heart
of the problems of uncertainty and instability surrounding the ques-
tion of patentability, in other words, the question of what is and is
not patentable.~' As such, any attempt if it is to be successful in bring-
ing certainty and stability to patent law must include a resolution
of the problems surrounding patentability, as well as an objective and
realistic definition of invention.
The creation of the CAFC in 1982 for the purpose of bringing
certainty and stability to patent law was only the latest in a series
of such attempts. Previous attempts included (1) the change from an
examining to a non-examining system," (2) the announcement of a "re-
quirement of invention" in the landmark case of Hotchkiss vs. Green-
wood,22 (3) the enactment of 35 U.S.C. section 10323 and (4) the land-
mark decision in Graham v. Deere.24 Of these attempts, only the deci-
sion in Hotchkiss and the enactment of section 103, involved substan-
tive changes to patent law. The rest of the attempts including the
creation of the CAFC were merely procedural.
16 years after Great A.& P, and 14 years after the enactment of S 103). Here in Graham,
the Supreme Court cited Great A.& P., and cautioned that the constitutional standard
may not be ignored. Furthermore, the Court stated that cases involving the validity
of patents require reference to the standard written into the constitution. Id.
For strong arguments recently recognizing the requirement of invention as good
law, see Edwards, That Clumsy Word Nonobviousness, in BNA, NONOBVIOUSNESS,
supra note 4, at 3:201. Judge Edwards concludes "I suggest then that the requirement
of invention for patentability is alive and well in the Supreme Court of the United
States, and as a consequence, in all the federal courts, and at the Patent Office." Id.
at 3:208.
Other evidence of the significance of the concept of invention to the patentabil-
ity issue can be found in the language of the current Patent Act and in the practice
and perspective of modern inventors. For example, the heading to the chapter of the
current Patent Act (chapter 10) specifically refers to "patentability of inventions". See
35 U.S.C. S 100-04 (1982). Furthermore scientists and other inventors see themselves
as working on inventions and seeking patents for inventions. See Brewer, The Seven
Stages of an Invention, JOURNAL OF COATINGS TECHNOLOGY, Apr. 1985, at 55-57; In
Virginia: A Convention for Inventions, TIME, Mar. 5, 1984, at 4; Pressman, Patent your
Inventions Properly to Avoid Legal Pitfalls, EDN, Oct. 4, 1984, at 337.
19. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Potts, Definition of Invention in Patent law, 7 MODERN L. REV.
113 (1944). The question of what is and what is not patentable is described as a subtle
and intractable issue, and as being the arch-problem of patent law. Id. at 113.
21. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
22. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
23. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
24. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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The Hotchkiss decision changed patent law (as then practiced)
by requiring that the determination of patentability include actual
proof of invention.25 Although this decision heightened the need for
an objective and realistic definition of invention, the Supreme Court
tried but was unable to develop such a definition. In fact the Supreme
Court eventually concluded that the concept of invention could not
be defined." The enactment of section 103 purportedly also changed
patent law. It did so by attempting to make unnecessary the need
to prove invention as part of the determination of patentability."
Despite this attempt under section 103, the rest of patent law including
section 103 itself contradictorily continues to expressly direct the PTO
and the courts to grant patents for inventions that are new, useful
and nonobvious.28 Because of this inherent contradiction between the
intent of section 103 and the express language of patent law, the
application of section 103 raised new problems and thus proved dif-
ficult and ineffective. As a result, there was continued uncertainty
and instability in patent law.
The creation of the CAFC and its mandate were primarily a
response to this state of affairs surrounding the application of sec-
tion 103.' Therefore the CAFC if it is to succeed in its mandate to
bring certainty and stability to patent law, must also deal with the
problems raised by the application of section 103. This means that
the CAFC must develop or adopt an objective and definitive test which
will enable the PTO and the federal district courts to effectively deter-
mine and agree on what is and what is not patentable. Such an objec-
tive and definitive test for patentability must include an objective
and realistic definition of the concept of invention as it is currently
used in patent law. In addition the CAFC must also address the in-
herent contradiction created by section 103. The critical questions fac-
ing the CAFC are therefore (1) whether it can judicially develop or
adopt such an objective and definitive test of patentability, and (2)
whether it can develop or adopt such a test as well as resolve the
contradiction created by section 103 without a Congressional repeal
of section 103.
This note on the one hand contends that such an objective and
definitive test of patentability cannot be developed or adopted judicial-
25. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
28. See 35 U.S.C. S 101-03 (1982). See also Graham v. Deere 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966).
29. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
1986]
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ly without repeal of section 103. This is because the origin, text and
recognized intent of section 103 are inherently contradictory and have
remained sources of uncertainty and concern even under the CAFC.
Furthermore, CAFC application of section 103 prevents consideration
of the principal concept of patentability, the concept of invention. On
the other hand, the note contends that judicial development of an
objective and definitive test of patentability is currently possible. The
key to such a test is the development of an objective and realistic
definition of invention. Such a definition of invention will be based
on knowledge about modern R&D fundamentals and knowledge about
the R&D process for developing actual inventions.
To support these contentions, this note will briefly examine the
history and significance of R&D to patent law. The note will then
overview United States patent law and the problem surrounding the
question of patentability. Next the note will review historically the
attempts to solve this problem (the problem of patentability) and the
difficulties and ineffectiveness of each attempt. The note then pro-
poses an effective solution which includes (1) a recommendation for
the repeal of section 103 because of its questionable intent and its
ineffectiveness, and (2) an adoption of a research and development-
based definition for the concept of invention.
II. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT-THE SOCIETAL
CONTEXT OF PATENT LAW
The purpose of United States patent law is to promote progress
in science and technology." The scientific and technological progress
sought to be promoted is achieved through the continued discovery
of new scientific principles and technical know-how, as well as through
the continued development of new products and processes employing
such discoveries. 1 In American society, the making of such discoveries
and the developing of these types of new products and processes have
been and continue to be the functions of R&D.2 Hence patent law
which is designed to promote progress in science and technology ac-
tually does so in part by promoting R&D. As such, R&D represents
30. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
31. See L. SILK. supra note 7, at 51.
32. See, e.g., D. HERTZ, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH
2-4 (1950). See also L. SILK, supra note 7, at 51. This statement of course stresses the
nature of the relationship between R&D and progress in science and technology. This
relationship is written about quite often, but it is usually never stated. See, e.g., J.
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 12-13, 19-20 (1978).
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a good part of the societal context of patent law.3 The implication
of this relationship is that the realities and concepts reflected by the
words of patent law, can and should be found in the purpose, essence
and structure of R&D, as well as in the requirements and methods
of R&D. For example, patent law should reflect the primary purpose
and essence of R&D which is solving problems.' Solving problems
in R&D involves the discovery of the knowledge necessary to satisfy
a need or want in society, and a successful and systematic application
of that knowledge to the particular need or want. Solving problems
as such is so essential to R&D, there actually can be no research where
there is no problem.35
Once a leisurely pastime of the rich, and a frustrating activity
for a few basement tinkerers, solving problems through R&D is to-
day largely an economic activity.' Although this function of R&D pre-
existed the enactment of the first United States Patent Act in 1790,"7
R&D as a field was too crude then to be of much teaching value to
patent law. In fact the field of R&D remained crude and unorganized
until about 1901.' Since then R&D has developed into a well organized
industry and into a sophisticated profession for scientists and
engineers.' Throughout this growth and development however, solving
33. The relationship between patent law and R&D is occasionally alluded to,
but is more often assumed or disregarded than not. Yet it is a critical relationship.
To stress this point by analogy, no subcommittee, committee or congress can honestly
expect to pass an agricultural act or a "farm bill" (under Title 7 of the U.S. Code)
if it knows nothing about United States agriculture. Furthermore, such an agricultural
act can not afford to ignore the relationship it must bear to agriculture. Agriculture
must be the societal context of such an act. The operative terms and concepts of such
an act must be agricultural terms and concepts. Such terms and concepts must be
understood by the farmers or farm community whose behavior the act seeks to in-
fluence and structure. Such terms and concepts must also be understood by those
charged with enforcing the act. The lesson in all of this lies in the fact that United
States agriculture is to such an act, what United States R&D should be to patent law!
34. See, e.g., J. KENNETH GALBRAITH, supra note 32, at 19-20; D. HERTZ, supra
note 32, at 2, 19-25.
35. D. HERTZ, supra note 32, at 26.
36. See, e.g., L. REDMAN & A. MORY, THE ROMANCE OF RESEARCH 54 (1933)
(a short illustrated history of R&D and inventions). For the economic aspect of R&D,
see L. SILK, supra note 7, at 2-4; In Virginia: A Convention for Inventions, TIME, Mar.
5, 1984, at 4 (independent inventors admit dreaming to be millionaires; some have
actually become millionaires); D. KARGER & R. MURDICK, MANAGING ENGINEERING AND
RESEARCH 12 (1980).
37. See, e.g., Sherwood, The Origins and Developments of the American Patent
System, 71 AM. SCIENTIST 500 (1983).
38. See, e.g., L. SILK, supra note 7, at 54.
39. Id. at 2-4, 161; see also J. KENNETH GALBRAITH, supra note 32, at 33n.
19861
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problems has remained the primary purpose and essence of R&D.
To achieve this primary purpose, R&D is currently structured
into two related stages, basic research and applied research." Basic
research has been defined as an exploration of the unknown with the
intent to discover new knowledge. 1 It is at this stage that R&D makes
discoveries of new knowledge in the form of scientific principles and
technical know-how. Applied research on the other hand, uses these
discoveries to develop new products and processes4" that satisfy the
needs and wants of society. This use by applied research of the
discoveries of basic research represents a critical and inherent rela-
tionship between the two stages. 3 The relationship and its order are
necessary for achieving technological progress. It is the embodiment
of a discovery in a product or process that makes that product or
process conceptually new. This empirical relationship between the
discoveries of basic research and the products and processes of applied
research is strong evidence of a relationship between discoveries
and inventions." In fact a key element in the sophistication of R&D
(and an important factor in R&D success) was the development of a
systematic and repeatable process for developing inventions based on
discoveries. 5 The inventions developed by this process are clearly what
patent law and patent policy seek to encourage.
III. UNITED STATES PATENT LAW AND THE
PROBLEM OF PATENTABILITY-OVERVIEW
United States patent law and policy stem from the Constitution
40. See, e.g., L. SILK, supra note 7, at 51. See also 15 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 739, 742 (1974).
41. See, e.g., L. SILK, supra note 7, at 51. Basic research is the same as pure
research.
42. Id.
43. Normally basic research precedes applied research. This is because ap-
plied research utilizes discoveries by basic research in the development of inventions.
Early on when this relationship between discoveries and inventions was not well
understood, one writer commented as follows. "[lit is possible that careful analysis
might establish the thesis that the process of invention is a development out of the
process of discovery, and that in the early stages we are dealing only with discoveries
and not with inventions." A. USHER, A HISTORY OF MECHANICAL INVENTION 11 (1929)
(emphasis added).
44. This is a critical relationship between discoveries and inventions. Unfor-
tunately current patent law confuses it by equating discoveries and inventions. See
35 U.S.C. S 100 (1982). Here, the term invention is said to mean the same thing as
discovery. It is clear however, that the empirical relationship between basic and ap-
plied research does not support this equating of the two concepts; nor does a fair
and accurate interpretation of the patent and copyright clause of the Constitution.
See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
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of the United States.46 The Constitution in what is called the patent
and copyright clause, authorizes the Congress of the United States
to make laws granting inventors exclusive rights for their discoveries."
Policywise, this clause limits such grants by expressly requiring that
the grants be for the purpose of promoting progress in science and
technology. 8 Pursuant to this authority and policy limitation, Congress
has at different times, enacted patent acts49 that have each expressly
required patents to be granted for inventions that satisfied certain
conditions. The first Patent Act' enacted in 1790 required patents to
be granted for inventions that were new, useful and sufficiently im-
portant.51 Subsequent patent acts retained these requirements until
1952. The current Patent Act"2 enacted in 1952, requires patents to
be granted for inventions that are new, useful and nonobvious.5 3
In addition to enacting patent acts, Congress created the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) and assigned to it the initial and primary
responsibility for determining which applications for patents meet the
requirements of the patent act and which do not.' Based on the ex-
press language of the current Patent Act, discharging this respon-
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8. "Congress shall have the power.. .to promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
47. Id.
48. Id. Although the actual language refers to "science and useful arts," nothing
is lost conceptually by updating this language to "science and technology." Technology
has been defined by one modern writer as the art of systematically applying scientific
or other organized knowledge to practical tasks. See J. KENNETH GALBRAITH, supra
note 32, at 12.
49. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1789-1799) (enacted April 10, 1790);
Patent Act of 1793, ch' 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1789-1799) (enacted Feb. 21, 1793); Patent Act
of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836-1845) (enacted July 4, 1836); Patent Act of 1870,
ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1869-1871) (enacted July 8, 1870); Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L.
No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 1-293 (1982)).
50. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1789-1799).
51. Id. SS 1-3.
52. 35 U.S.C. SS 1-376 (1982).
53. Id. SS 101-03. See also Graham v. Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1966). It
should be noted that the courts have attempted since 1952 to avoid the use of the
term invention by use of phrases like "the subject matter sought to be patented"
or "subject matter as a whole." Despite these attempts the express language of the
Patent Act and its context indicate that these phrases are just other ways of characteriz-
ing invention. In any case, even if the concept of "subject matter as a whole" is broader
than that of "invention," it certainly must include "invention" as a subconcept. Other
attempts to avoid reference to invention by using the abstract nouns "novelty." "util-
ity" and "nonobviousness" merely beg the question "of what?" See infra note 286
and accompanying text. The answer to be found expressly in the language of the statute
is that the reference is to the utility, novelty and nonobviouness of invention.
54. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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sibility would appear to require the PTO to make at least two deter-
minations. First the PTO has to determine that the subject matter
of the patent application is an invention and second, it must deter-
mine whether the invention is new, useful and nonobvious.
A. The Patent System - How It Works and Why
The current Patent Act enacted in 1952 contains specific provi-
sions regarding the patenting of inventions. For obtaining a patent,
the Act provides that an individual who invents a product or process'
may apply to the Patent and Trademark Office for a patent to cover
the invention.' The application must state at least one claim57 that
defines and measures the invention sought to be patented.' The PTO
is required to examine the individual's application for compliance with
patent law as currently construed by the federal courts. 9 The PTO
then issues or refuses to issue a patent on the subject matter of the
application depending on the results of its examination. If the appli-
cant is not satisfied with final PTO determination,6 1 he may seek
review in the federal court system.2 A patent, issued either on PTO
55. The actual language in the text refers to "process, machine, manufacture
or composition of matter, or any... improvement thereof." 35 U.S.C. S 101 (1982). The
term "process" was used for the first time in 1952 replacing the old term "art," in
order to conform the text to current usage. See Federico, Commentary on the New
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. SS 1-110, at 1, 15 (West 1954) (hereinafter cited as Federico, Com-
mentary). Using the phrase "product or process" here similarly conforms and simplifies
the meaning of the text without changing it. It should be noted that "machines, manufac-
tures, compositions of matter as well as improvements to them" are basically all prod-
ucts. See A. MILLER & M. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND
COPYRIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 18 (1983) (hereinafter cited as MILLER-DAVIS).
56. 35 U.S.C. S 101 (1982).
57. Claims are statements by the applicant describing his invention, usually
as a means or series of steps for performing a specified function. 35 U.S.C. S 112 (1982).
Claims may or may not include the physical or structural specifications of the product
or process that represent the invention. Id.
58. Id.
59. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE S 706 (1982). The manual
clearly states that examiners carry the responsibility of making sure that the stand-
ard of patentability enunciated by the Supreme Court is applied in each and every
case. Subsections of S 706 also contain numerous citations to appellate and district
court decisions as precedents to be followed by examiners. Id. at S 706.03.
60. 35 U.S.C. S 131 (1982).
61. Final PTO determination of whether or not a patent issues on an applica-
tion is made by a PTO Board of Appeals. The Board of Appeals is made up of the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, his assistants and chief examiners or
examiners-in-chief. Currently, Board of Appeals members are all required to be com-
petent in legal and scientific matters. Id. at S 7.
62. The applicant currently has two alternatives for appealing a final PTO
decision. He can appeal directly to the newly created Court of Appeals for the Federal
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determination or by court order, is good for 17 years."3 By issuing
the patent, the government gives a patentee the right to exclude
others for 17 years, from making, using or selling the patented inven-
tion anywhere within the United States."
This right to exclude others from making, using or selling the
invention for 17 years offers valuable protection to inventors. The
protection offered is valuable because it gives inventors an opportunity
to recoup their investments in the development of the invention. 5
Without this protection, the new knowledge or technical know-how
represented by an invention can be pirated or appropriated by others
without compensating the inventor.6 Inventors are therefore very in-
terested in obtaining patent protection for their inventions. 7 For-
tunately for inventors, the Government is also very interested on the
other hand, in granting the patent protection sought by inventors.
The government grants patent protection because of government in-
terest in the early disclosure of the new knowledge and technical
know-how represented by inventions. The government interest is
Circuit, 35 U.S.C. SS 141-45 (1982); 28 U.S.C. S 1295(a) (4) (A) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
He can also bring civil action in the District Court for the District of Columbia against
the Commissioner of Patents. 35 U.S.C. S 145 (1982). The decision of the district court
is appealable to the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. S 1295(a)
(4) (C) (1982). The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is reviewable
by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. S 1254 (1982). For alternative ways to review PTO
decisions prior to creation of the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, see
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 523-28 (1966).
63. 35 U.S.C. 5 154 (1982).
64. Id. Also see id. at S 100(c), where the term United States has been con-
strued to include United States territories and possessions. But see 1984 Patent Law
Amendment Law of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, S 101, 98 Stat. 3383 (1984) (amends S
271 of 35 U.S.C.). The amendments extend patent right protection beyond the United
States by prohibiting unauthorized importation or exportation of products or components
made by United States patented processes.
65. This assurance is necessary because inventing today is largely an economic
activity pursued for gain. See, e.g., D. KARGER & R. MURDICK, supra note 36, at 12.
66. For a full discussion of this point with particular emphasis on the need
for patent protection, see L. SILK, supra note 7, at 4.
67. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 208
(1968).
68. See 35 U.S.C. S 112 (1982). The Constitutional and ultimate purpose of the pa-
tent system is to promote progress in science and technology. U.S. CONST. art. I, S
8, cl. 8. This is accomplished by encouraging early disclosure of new knowledge to
the public. In stating this purpose, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
said, "the basic public policy underlying the patent system is to encourage the
disclosure of inventions through issuance of patents." Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal
Chemical Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983). For this reason, the patent system
is generally seen as an "incentive-to-disclosure" system. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco
S.A., 714 F.2d 1110, 1115 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Patent protection, of course, is what
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based on its recognition that early disclosure of such knowledge and
technical know-how facilitates the development of new and even
greater knowledge and technical know-how. 9 This in turn assures con-
tinued technological progress as well as continued investment in the
economy. 0
To insure such full disclosure and the technological progress and
economic investment it brings, patent rights granted by the govern-
ment must be protected against possible violations. Under the cur-
rent Patent Act, the process for protecting patent rights is based
heavily in the judgment and enforcement powers of the federal
courts." As part of the protection process, all patentees are required
to clearly mark their patent numbers on their inventions." It is also
up to each patentee to discover and allege violations or infringements
of his or her patent rights. The Act then provides for a patentee who
discovers an infringement of his or her patent rights to sue the violator
for patent infringement. 3
As a defense in a patent infringement suit, the Act allows the
alleged infringer to challenge the validity of the patent allegedly in-
fringed."' In effect, the infringer is allowed to challenge the initial
is offered as the incentive for the desired disclosure. A contractual analogy has even
been drawn in this situation as between the government and the patentee. See D.
KARGER & R. MURDICK, supra note 36, at 489. Contractually, the patentee's disclosure
is viewed as consideration for the patent rights and protection the patentee receives from
the government. Id. at 490. Disclosure is therefore essential to the determination of
patentability.
69. One unique characteristic of the results of scientific research is that they
grow by feeding on themselves. See, e.g., L. SILK, supra note 7, at 163. Discovery by
feeding on discovery, breeds new discoveries; and innovation by feeding on innovation
breeds different innovations. Id. This, of course, is exactly the situation patent law
seeks to encourage by authorizing the grant of special privileges for the full disclosure
of the discoveries of inventors.
70. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD. supra note 67, at 207 (the patent system is a
major instrument of government policy to encourage technological progress). See also
D. KARGER & R. MURDICK, supra note 36, at 511 (patents are the backbone of inven-
tions); Note, Patent Policy and Invention, 46 ILL. L. REV. 609, 626 (1951) (the patent
system is noted as being essential to the survival of small businesses).
71. The violation of the patent rights of one individual by another is a civil
matter involving patents. The PTO has no enforcement powers in this regard. Fur-
thermore, the United States Congress has granted the federal courts exclusive jurisdic-
tion in civil matters involving patents. 28 U.S.C. S 1338 (1982). The role of the federal
courts in protecting patent rights is therefore very significant.
72. 35 U.S.C. S 287 (1982).
73. Any unauthorized making, using or selling of another's patented product
or process is an infringement. 35 U.S.C. S 271 (1982). The suit brought by a patentee
for infringement of his patent rights is an infringement action. The suit is authorized
by statute. Id. S 281.
74. Id. S 282(2)-(3).
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PTO determination on the application for that particular patent. As
a consequence of this defense, the federal courts are required to reex-
amine the initial PTO grant of that patent.75 If the federal court comes
to the same conclusion as did the PTO, the court upholds the validity
of the patent thus entitling the patentee to a judicial remedy against
the infringer." If the court comes to the opposite conclusion, the patent
is declared invalid. When the patent is declared invalid, anyone is
then free to make use or sell the product or process once protected
by the invalidated patent." In other words, the patent system has
failed to protect PTO-granted patent rights on which an inventor and
other businessmen in reliance had already invested money. This failure
serves neither the interests of inventors and businessmen, nor those
of the government. The failure is thus evidence of instability in the
patent system." Overall, the failure or success of the process for ob-
taining a patent and the process for protecting patent rights, depend
squarely on PTO and court determinations of what is and is not paten-
table (patentability) under United States Patent law. As such, the ef-
fectiveness of the patent system in protecting both government and
private interests in it, also depends on the determination of paten-
tability.
B. Patentability - the Concept of Invention and the Constitution
The Constitution and the patent act in force control and limit the
determination of what is and what is not patentable under United States
75. Patentees do frequently attempt to introduce new evidence in court regard-
ing features of the infringed product or process. See, e.g., Graham, 383 U.S. at 23 (regar-
ding "flexing"); id. at 25 (where such efforts are characterized as "after thought").
Such attempts however are not allowed by law. See supra note 59 and accompanying
text.
76. Court injunctions and damages are the judicial remedies available for in-
fringement. 35 U.S.C. SS 281-294 (1982).
77. A patentee, who loses an infringement suit against an alleged infringer,
can never again sue anyone else for infringement of the same patent. Once a patent
is declared invalid in one case, it is invalid for all cases thereafter. See Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971). Because
of this, differences between what the PTO thinks is patentable and what the courts
will accept as patentable often have serious consequences for inventors and businessmen
who invest in inventions.
78. The phrase patent system as used in this note includes all the participants
and the law involved in the seeking, granting, and protection of patent rights. It also
includes the functional relationships and structures of the participants as determined
by United States patent law and pol'icy. The participants include individual inventors
and the businessmen who invest in the inventions, the PTO, the federal courts, and
the United States Congress. A stable patent system is one in which the process for
obtaining patents and that for protecting patent rights, work to serve all the interests
involved. Therefore, when the process for protecting PTO-granted patent rights fails,
the entire system is destabilized.
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patent law."9 The Constitution does so through the language as well as
congressional and judicial interpretation of the patent and copyright
clause.' This clause plainly authorizes the government to grant special
privileges (patents) to inventors for their discoveries." Recognizing or
interpreting this language as containing the concepts of invention and
of discovery is fair and accurate." By directing patents to be granted
for inventions (that in addition satisfy other statutory conditions) patent
acts enacted pursuant to and interpreting this clause, represent such
a recognition or interpretation by Congress. Recognizing or interpreting
the clause in this manner is fair and accurate for at least 3 reasons. First,
the term inventor obviously embodies the concept of invention.1
Secondly, the history of the development of the patent and copyright
clause clearly indicates that the framers of the Constitution undoubtedly
understood the difference as well as the relationship between discoveries
and inventions.' Thirdly, this interpretation which implies an inherent
79. This is because patent law is exclusively federal. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8.
81. Id.
82. See infra note 84.
83. An inventor obviously is one who invents or one who has developed an
invention. The concept of invention is therefore embodied in the use of the term
inventor.
84. The plain meaning of the patent and copyright clause with regard to patents
is that privileges (i.e., patent rights) are to be issued to inventors for their discoveries.
See supra note 46. (The term "inventors" obviously embodies the concept of invention.)
The patent and copyright clause was a committee's version of suggestions from James
Madison and Charles Pickney. See Ramsey, The Historical Background of Patents, 18
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 6, 13 (1936). Madison had suggested that "the advancement of useful
knowledge and discoveries" be encouraged by premiums and provisions. Id. Pickney,
on the other hand, suggested that "patents be granted for useful inventions." Id.
Although the term "inventors" does not appear in either suggestion, the concept of
invention clearly does. Recognition of two critical and logical relationships, one bet-
ween inventions and inventors and the other between discoveries and inventions, is
all that is necessary to reasonably explain the derivation of the clause from the two
suggestions.
The first relationship requires that to be called an inventor, an individual must
have already invented something or developed an invention. This is merely a logical
and descriptive conclusion. Use of the term "inventors" was therefore an expression
of Pickney's suggestion. Id. The second relationship is based on the empirical and in-
herent fact that a "discovery" is an essential element of every invention. See supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, there is adequate evidence to indicate that the framers of the
Constitution understood the difference if not the relationship between discoveries and
inventions. Although there were few major inventions in the U.S. before 1800, there
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and empirical relationship between inventions and discoveries is sup-
ported by actual practice in R&D.8" For these reasons, arguments to the
contrary are therefore logically inconsistent and not persuasive."
The patent act in force also controls and limits the determination
of patentability. The act does so by its express terms and judicial inter-
pretation of any vague terms. Specifically, the first Patent Act" inter-
preting the patent and copyright clause in 1790 directed the government
to grant patents for inventions that were new, useful and sufficiently
important." Subsequent patent acts retained this same requirement and
its conditions until 1952. The current Patent Act enacted in 1952, changed
the last condition by directing the PTO and the courts to grant patents
for inventions that are new, useful and nonobvious 9
were already a lot of well-known ones in Europe and elsewhere. See, e.g., 1984 WORLD
ALMANAC 768-770 (1984) (hereinafter cited as 1984 ALMANAC). In fact by 1787 (the year
of the U.S. Constitutional Convention) there were patent systems in England, Con-
necticut, and Massachusetts, each granting patents for inventions. See Ramsey, supra,
at 10-13. South Carolina (Charles Pickney's colony) also had a patent act by 1784 granting.
exclusive privileges to the inventors of useful machines, etc. See Fenning, The Origin
of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109, 115 (1929).
The inventions being patented must have been recognized as distinct and separate
from mere scientific discoveries. See, e.g, 1984 ALMANAC, supra, at 770-71. The
Almanac lists the discovery of laws of nature and of chemical elements, among other
scientific discoveries made before 1787. There is, therefore, sufficient evidence to in-
dicate that the framers of the Constitution clearly understood the difference between
inventions and discoveries. The combination of Madison's and Pickney's suggestions
into the single clause despite an understanding of this difference, is reasonable evidence
that the framers of the Constitution also understood the empirical and inherent rela-
tionship between discoveries and inventions. Since each word in the Constitutional
provision must be assumed to have an important meaning, see Ramsey, supra, at 14,
interpreting the patent and copyright clause as containing a requirement of invention
is reasonably fair and accurate.
85. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
86. See, Federico, Commentary, supra note 55, at 19. Federico argues that
the term "invents" in S 101 of the present Act, and the term inventor in the Constitu-
tion, are used only in the sense of "authorship." This would mean that the word in-
vent as used in S 101 of the present Act connotes no more than the word make. If
so, the meaning of S 101 is best had from reading it as, "whoever makes a new and
useful product or process . . . may obtain a patent thereon." If this is the meaning
of S 101, then one must wonder where else in the entire patent act one finds another
source for the concept of the invention as it now appears in the act!
87. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1789-1799).
88. Id. SS 1-3.
89. See supra notes 13-15, 28 and accompanying text.
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C. The Patentability Problem
Unfortunately, Congress has never defined the term invention
or the concept of invention as it is used in the patent acts and in
the patent and copyright clause of the constitution. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court attempted to define invention objectively and
realistically, but was unsuccessful. Because the concept of invention
is central to the question of what is and is not patentable, the lack
of an objective and realistic definition of invention eventually led to
a conflict between the PTO and the courts." This lack of an objective
and realistic definition of invention as well as the inability of inven-
tors, the PTO, and the federal courts to effectively and predictably
determine and agree on what is and is not patentable, are at the center
of what is referred to as the patentability problem. 1 The determina-
tion of patentability has been a problem as such since the first Pa-
tent Act. In fact the history of patent law in great part is a history
of attempts to solve this particular problem. In other words, the
history of patent law in great part is a history of attempts to resolve
the uncertainty and instability caused by the inability of the patent
system to effectively determine and agree on what is and is not paten-
table.2
IV. UNSUCCESSFUL SOLUTIONS TO THE PATENTABILITY PROBLEM -
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
A. Examining to Non-examining System; Creation of the PTO
Historically, the problem surrounding the determination of what
is and is not patentable started with enactment and application of
90. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Potts, supra note 20, at 113. The problem of patentability is
described as subtle and intractable and as being the arch-problem of patent law. See
also, Comment, Patents - The Changing Standard of Patentable Invention: Confusion
Compounded, 55 MICH. L. REV. 985-86 (1957). In speaking of patentability or the stan-
dard of patentable invention, the writer concludes that "no problem in the law of patents
has caused more confusion than the standard of patentable invention." Id.
The problem of patentability or the patentability problem includes: (1) the need
for the Supreme Court or the CAFC to develop or adopt an objective and realistic
definition of the concept of invention as it is required by, and as it is currently used
in patent law; (2) resolution of the questionable and ineffective attempt by Congress
to abandon, or eliminate the patent law Constitutional requirement of invention by
enacting S 103 of the 1952 Act; (3) resolution of the apparent contradiction between
the patent law practice of requiring patent claims to define invention, and assertions
by the courts under S 103 that proof of invention is no longer required for determin-
ing patentability. These factors of the patentability problem are undoubtedly the
underlying causes of continued uncertainty and instability in patent law.
92. See infra notes 99-249 and accompanying text.
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the first Patent Act in 1790.93 The 1790 Patent Act provided that
anyone who invented or discovered a new and useful product or pro-
cess could obtain a patent for the invention." The Act however did
not define invention. This 1790 Act also created the first patent system
and provided for an examination process.95 In addition thie Act pro-
vided for a three-member team to conduct the examination." The
three-member team had the authority to decide whether to issue or
refuse patents. 7 A patent was to issue only if the team found that
an application was for an invention that was not only new and useful,
but was also "useful and sufficiently important."9
It soon became apparent under the 1790 Act that there was great
difficulty in distinguishing between what was and was not an inven-
tion.9 This difficulty, combined with the lack of a definition of the
term invention, was the beginning of the patentability problem. As
a response to the difficulties faced by the three-member team, Con-
gress decided in 1793 to enact a new act and to abolish the need for
an examination.
Consequently, the Patent Act of 179300 replaced the examina-
tion process with a clerical or mere registration process.' ° The 1793
Act also did away with the three-member team and its power to refuse
to issue patents.' 2 Patents therefore were to issue on all submitted
applications. The result of these changes was apparently unacceptable
and in 1836 Congress reestablished an examination system.
A new Patent Act was enacted in 1836."3 Besides reinstating
the examination process,"4 the 1836 Act also created the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO)."' Instead of the three-member team, the PTO
was responsible for conducting the examination."' The 1836 Patent
93. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1789-1799).
94. Id. S 1.
95. Id.
96. Id. SS 1-3.
97. Id.
98. Id. S 1.
99. This difficulty was noted by the Supreme Court in Graham, 383 U.S. at
9. The information was from the writings of Thomas Jefferson who as Secretary of
State was a member of the three-member team.
100. Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318 (1789-1799).
101. See S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2394, 2397 (hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1979).
102. Id.
103. Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117 (1836-1845).
104. Id. S 7, 119-20. See also S. REP. No. 1979, supra note 101, reprinted
in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2397.
105. Patent Act of 1836 SS 1-2, 5 Stat. 117 (1936-1845).
106. Id. S 1.
19861
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Act also reinstated the requirement that patents issue for inventions
that were new, useful, and sufficiently important.' 7 Like the 1790 Act,
the 1836 Act did not define invention or provide any objective criteria
for deciding what was or was not an invention, or deciding when an
invention was or was not sufficiently useful and important. Conse-
quently, the PTO, like the three-member team before it, also had dif-
ficulty implementing the reinstated examination process. This diffi-
culty, together with poor staffing conditions at the PTO,' 5 led again
to unacceptable results 9 and to public dissatisfaction over the inef-
fectiveness of the patent system.
B. The Requirement of Invention-Hotchkiss v. Greenwood
The unacceptable state of patent law and public dissatisfaction
continued until 1850. In 1850 the United States Supreme Court
responded. In the landmark case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,"' the Court
formulated and announced what has come to be called the "require-
ment of invention.'. In this landmark case, the Court invalidated a
patent initially issued by the PTO for an improved method of form-
ing doorknobs out of clay rather than out of metal."2 The Court held
that the substitution of clay for metal was not an invention because
the substitution did not require any more ingenuity and skill than
that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business."'
107. Id. S 6.
108. The staff of the Patent Office grew from 4 employees in 1836, id. SS
1-2, to 182 employees in 1870. See Patent Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 198, 198-200 (1869-1871).
Little or no expertise was required of examiners until 1870. Staffing was by political
appointment. Id. at 198. The Commissioner of Patents was also authorized to augment
the staff with temporaries. See Patent Act of 1837 S 11, 5 Stat. 194 (1836-1845).
109. A good illustration of the unacceptable results that led to public dissatisfac-
tion is the number of patents that issued on the simple idea of a campaign torch.
See H. COLLINS, POLITICAL CAMPAIGN TORCHES, U.S. NATIONAL MUSEUM BULLETIN No.
241 (1964). Between 1837 and 1900 more than 55 patents were issued on the campaign
torch idea of "a wick in a bowl of oil, on a handle." See id. at 3. There was a patent
for every shade and shape of the bowl; for every height and form of the handle; and
for every tilt and combination of wicks. See id. at 18-44.
110. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
111. Id. at 267. This announcement by the Supreme Court is generally accepted
as a judicial creation. See, e.g., Hartung, Prior Art: The Undefined Key to Section 103
of the 1952 Patent Act, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 703, 708 (1982). However, it is more
reasonable to consider it merely as a judicial recognition of the Constitutional and
statutory requirement that patents issue for inventions. See supra notes 18 and 84
and accompanying text. The requirement of invention was therefore only a recogni-
tion of the need to define and to look for invention as a prerequisite to patentability.
112. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 264.
113. Id. at 265.
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The Court also held that to be patentable, the claims of an applica-
tion for a patent must reflect a certain degree of ingenuity and skill.'14
The significance of the Court's announcements in Hotchkiss was that
for the first time, the PTO and the courts had to define as well as
require proof of invention as a prerequisite to patentability. Although
the Supreme Court in this case did not directly define invention, it
clearly indicated its view of invention. The Court did so when it fur-
ther stated that ingenuity and skill are essential elements of inven-
tion.1 '
114. Id. at 267. In essence, the Supreme Court was directing the PTO not to
issue patents unless what the applicant had developed and claimed in each case con-
stituted invention. The claims were to be examined for a reflection of ingenuity and
skill, and the level reflected had to be greater than that possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business. The federal courts were to do likewise when
reviewing PTO patent grants in infringement cases.
115. Id. at 267. The term invention, however, was not defined in the 1790 Act
or in any of the subsequent acts. Defining invention had therefore been left to the
courts. There are basically three views of invention which cover all ordinary mean-
ings of the concept of invention The first, and perhaps most common view is to see
invention as the thing invented. This view and the others that follow, date back to
about 1500. See, e.g., 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 453 (1933). This first view
of invention, which can be described as objective, leads to a definition of invention
that is in terms of the elements and characteristics of the thing invented. A typical
definition of invention according to this view, describes invention as "something pro-
duced by original contrivance; a method or means of doing something previously
unknown that is originated by some person." Id. at 453. The second and equally objec-
tive view is to see invention as the action or manner of inventing. Id. at 452. Accor-
dingly, invention is defined in terms of the elements and characteristics of the method
or manner of inventing. For example, invention is defined as "the original contrivance
or production of a new method or means of doing something previously unknown."
Id. at 452.
The third view is to see invention as a type of faculty or degree of the mental
powers of an alleged inventor. Id. at 452. Based on this view, invention is defined
in terms of the mental attributes of an individual. Typically, invention is defined as
"the faculty of inventing; the power of mental creation; inventiveness." Id. at 453.
Invention in this sense is properly used when an individual is described as being a
person of great invention. Id. This is similar to also describing the person as being
of great skill; as a person of many talents; or as a person of great wit. This third
view of invention is clearly subjective, and inappropraite for patent law purposes. Un-
fortunately, it is the view that best represents the Supreme Courts view of invention
in Hotchkiss.
Similar views of invention also appear in Webster's dictionaries. For example,
invention is defined objectively as "purposeful experimentation leading to the develop-
ment of a new product or process; origination." See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1188 (unabr. ed. 1981). On the other hand, invention is also defin-
ed subjecdively as "a mental power to conceive ideas; a faculty for creative selection. Id.
Again, this subjective view of invention as a mental attribute, best represents
the Supreme Courts view of invention in Hotchkiss. Despite the obvious differences
between the objective and subjective views of invention as contained in these dic-
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1. The Hotchkiss View of Invention and Other Views
This language of the Supreme Court regarding ingenuity and
skill being essential elements of invention appears to have been an
inaccurate and inappropriate characterization of the concept of inven-
tion for patent law purposes. " ' The language indicates that invention
is to be found in the subjective state of mind (mental powers) and
in the personal attributes of the applicant or patentee, "7 as opposed
to being found in the objective elements and functional characteristics
of either the thing invented or the process of invention. "8 Unfortunately,
the concept of invention as contemplated by this particular view of
the Supreme Court is certainly not the concept of invention that the
patent acts require to be new and useful."9 Consequently, this Hot-
chkiss view of invention was undoubtedly inappropriate for patent law
purposes. Because this view of invention was subjective and clearly
inappropriate, it eventually frustrated subsequent Supreme Court at-
tempts to define invention for use in patent law. This is because in
such subsequent attempts to define invention, the Supreme Court un-
fortunately adhered to its Hotchkiss view of invention. 2 '
Occasionally however the Court did express a different and
apparently objective view of invention. For example, in an 1874 case
involving a patent for a piece of rubber for use as a pencil eraser,21
tionary definitions, there is no reported decision by the United States Supreme Court
which expressly relies on a dictionary definition of invention.
116. This view is inaccurate and inappropriate because, of the three different
ways to look at inventions. See supra note 115. The third view is the least pertinent
for patent law purposes. The first patent act expressly required that the invention
be of a process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter. See Patent Act of
1790 S 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1789-1799). The invention that resulted from the inventing or
discovery was to be new and useful. Id. All subsequent patent acts have retained
this view of invention. The Supreme Court's view, which looks instead at the mental
powers or faculty of the applicant or patentee, was therefore mistaken. See also
MILLER-DAVIS, supra note 56, at 74. The best use of the Supreme Court's view is
achieved by speaking of a person as being a person of great invention. See supra note
115. This is in the same vein as speaking of a person as being a person of great skill,
of great ingenuity or of great talent. Note that this was the particular view that the
Supreme Court finally abandoned. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text. The
Court's abandonment of such a view should not therefore be used as justification for
not defining other views of invention.
117. See supra note 115.
118. Id.
119. It does not make sense in the patent law context, to speak of new and
useful ingenuity and skill or of new and useful mental powers. This simply illustrates
that the Hotchkiss view of invention was ill-placed.
120. See supra note 115.
121. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498 (1874). See supra note 115.
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the Supreme Court expressed what amounted to an objective view
of invention. The Court stated that an idea of itself is not patentable,
but that a new device by which the idea is made practically useful
is patentable.122 In expressing this view, the Court did not consider
or mention the skill or ingenuity of the developer of the device as
being elements of invention. The Court also expressed a similar view
in an 1876 case involving the substitution of celluloid for vulcanite
in artificial teeth fasteners.'23 The Court held that the substitution
in this 1876 case as distinguished from Hotchkiss was indeed inven-
tion. In doing so, the Court stated that a substitution that involved
a new mode of construction or a substitution that developed new uses
and properties of the material formed could amount to an invention.2 "
Again the court did not consider or mention the skill and ingenuity
of the applicant.
Despite the few decisions attempting to express this objective
view of invention, the Supreme Court however held firmly to its view
of invention as expressed in Hotchkiss.'25 Typically, when the Court
was confronted with the question of what was and was not an inven-
tion, the Court required that to qualify as an invention, a product
or process must be the result of some exercise of the inventive
faculties." As discussed under Hotchkiss, this was an unfortunate and
an inappropriate view of the concept of invention as it is used in patent
law.' Because the Hotchkiss view of invention was subjective and
inappropriate, Supreme Court efforts to define it for patent law pur-
poses were eventually unsuccessful.
2. The Supreme Court's Inability to Define Invention -Consequences
In 1891, the Supreme Court finally recognized the difficulty in
defining its Hotchkiss view of invention for practical use in patent
law. As a result, the Court in McClain v. Ortmayer128 expressly aban-
122. Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. at 507.
123. Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite, 93 U.S. 486, 496 (1876).
124. Id. at 496.
125. 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 267. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Wilson Packing Co. v. Chicago Packing & Provision Co., 105 U.S.
566, 571 (1881). Although it is not quite clear what the court means by a product be-
ing the result of an exercise of the inventive faculties, the real focus still appears
to be on the mental power or faculties of the alleged inventor. This is, therefore, still
the subjective view of invention from Hotchkiss. See, e.g., MILLER -DAVIS. supra note
55, at 74.
127. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
128. 141 U.S. 419 (1891).
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doned further efforts to define invention.1" In McClain, the Court
stated that no definition of invention could prove helpful in determin-
ing "whether or not a particular product or process involved an exer-
cise of the inventive faculty."'" From then on, the Court adopted a
case-by-case approach in determining the issue of invention. The court
thought that such determinations were best made by relying on
experience with old products and processes that had been found not
to be inventions. 3 Such reliance was necessary because the Supreme
Court, in abandoning further efforts to define invention, could not and
had not abandoned the need or requirement to look for invention as
a prerequisite to patentability.132 This aspect of the requirement of
invention was still binding on the patent system. However, because
there was no objective and realistic definition of invention, the PTO
and the courts in looking for invention had to rely mostly on what
have been described as negative tests of inventions."
Negative tests of invention were case-by-case characterizations
of alleged inventions as involving or not involving mere changes in
form, in proportion, in degree, or in materials." Under these tests,
if an alleged invention could be so characterized, the conclusion was
that it was not an invention and therefore was not patentable. If it
could not be so characterized, then it was generally deemed to be
129. Id. at 427.
130. Id.
131. Id. In other words, the Court was asserting that although it could not
define invention, it would recognize an invention if it found one. If this sounds familiar,
it is because the dilemma inherent in this assertion was again expressed by the Court
in its unsuccessful attempts to define the term "obscenity." See Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Rich, Laying the Ghost of
the Invention Requirement, 1 A.P.L.A. Q.J. 26, 30 (1973). Here Judge Rich saw the con-
nection between the Court's treatment of the terms invention and obscenity. The judge
expressed this invention-obscenity connection by stating that the essence of being a
patent lawyer, a patent examiner or a judge in a patent case was "to know an inven-
tion when you saw one." Id.
132. It should be noted that the requirement of invention as announced in Hotch-
kiss involved two needs: (1) the need to define invention and (2) the need to look for
invention as a prerequisite to patentability. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
While the need to look for invention had to be satisfied on a case-by-case basis, the
need to define invention could have been satisfied by a single, general definition, had
one been possible. What the Supreme Court abandoned in McClain was simply the
need to define invention generally. See McClain, 141 U.S. at 427. The need to look
for invention therefore was retained. In fact, this need to look for invention exists
even today under the CAFC in the practice of examining the claims of applications
for invention. See infra notes 245-248 and accompanying text.
133. See Castellan, The Shifting Sands of Skill and Ingenuity, 28 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 416, 425 (1946). See also 2 WALKER ON PATENTS S 6:41-6:50 (Lipscomb's ed. 1985).
134. Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U.S. 187, 199 (1876).
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an invention and therefore was patentable. This case-by-case negative tests
approach was however subjective and thus did not provide satisfac-
tory guidance for applying the requirement of invention.'" Therefore,
efforts to press the Supreme Court for a definition of invention
continued.
In 1941, in a case which clearly involved the application of modern
technology or know-how, a strong effort was made pressing the
Supreme Court for a definition of invention. The case, Cuno Engineer-
ing v. Automatic Devices Corp.,' involved a PTO-granted patent for
an improved automobile cigarette lighter.'37 Unlike earlier automobile
lighters, the lighter in Cuno employed an automatic, thermostatically
controlled electrical circuit. The use of such a circuit in appliances
such as electric heaters, toasters and irons was however already well-
known.'" The issue therefore was whether extension of the same
technology from the toaster or heater to a cigarette lighter amounted
to an invention. In resolving this issue, however, the Court again did
not define invention. Instead, it invalidated the patent because the
extension of the technology of thermostatically controlled circuits to
the cigarette lighter did not reveal a "flash of creative genius."'39
The Court's language regarding a "flash of creative genius" was
interpreted as announcing a new test or measure of what the court
regarded as an invention.'" Although the specific language of "creative
genius" appears to have been nothing more than the "degree of in-
genuity" language in Hotchkiss,' the "flash of creative genius" test
was widely criticized.' 2 Because of the criticism, the test never found
much use.' Consequently, the PTO and the courts were again left
with a need to look for invention as a prerequisite to patentability,
135. See, e.g., MILLER-DAVIS, supra note 55, at 76-77.
136. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
137. Id. at 86.
138. Id. at 91.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Invention-Flash of Genius Test, 11 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 535, 537
(1943) (Most courts considered the phrase "flash of genius" as a mere unfortunate choice
of words to express what had always been the law. They believed the proper criterion
for granting patents is improvement over the prior art, and not the state of the
patentees mind.).
141. 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 267.
142. See generally Banett, Flash of Genius Fallacy, 25 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 785
(1943).
143. The second sentence of S 103 finally overruled the flash of creative genius
test. See Federico, Commentary , supra note 55, at 23. The sentence in S 103 requires
that patentability of an invention shall not be negatived by the manner (flash of creative
genius or not] in which the invention was made (emphasis added). See infra note 166.
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but without an objective and realistic definition of invention. Since
the patent system requires the PTO and the courts to occasionally
determine patentability in the same case but at different times, look-
ing for invention without an objective definition of invention soon pro-
duced a conflict between the PTO and the federal courts.
14 4
The conflict involved a difference between what the PTO and
the federal courts thought was or was not invention. Because patent
law essentially directed the PTO to grant patents for inventions,
4
1
this difference between the PTO and the courts over what was an
invention meant the courts were invalidating PTO-granted patents
challenged in the courts. In fact, by 1949 the conflict had become so
intense that it prompted Justice Jackson to remark, "I doubt that
the remedy for such Patent Office passion for granting patents [in-
discriminately] is an equally strong passion in [the Supreme court]
for striking them down so [much so that] the only patent that is valid
is one which this court has not been able to get its hands on."'14
6
Although Justice Jackson appears in this comment to side with the
PTO, he nonetheless also admitted that the PTO was improperly
granting patents.'4 By 1949, the situation in the patent system involvi-
ng the conflict between the PTO and the federal courts, the lack of.
an objective and realistic definition of invention, and the case-by-case
negative test approach for determining invention, had already caused
an unacceptable degree of indefiniteness and a general lack of unifor-
mity. The net result was that patent law and the patent system were
unstable and were not accomplishing in society what they were de-
signed to accomplish.
Because of the government interest in a stable patent system,
Congress was forced to respond to this lack of definiteness and unifor-
mity. So in 1949, Congress decided to revise and codify the patent
laws.14' The hope and the objective behind the revision and codifica-
144. This is termed a conflict not so much because PTO interests were op-
posed to those of the courts, but simply because they could not agree on what was
an invention. Besides the language of Justice Jackson, other language reflecting the
conflict also appears in a number of Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Graham, 383
U.S. at 18 (Supreme Court observes a notorious difference between standards applied
by the PTO and the courts). See also Great A & P, 340 U.S. at 156 (Douglas, J., con-
curring) (The PTO is criticized for discretionarily issuing patents on gadgets and sim-
ple devices that do not advance scientific knowledge.).
145. See supra notes 18 and 84 and accompanying text.
146. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton, 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
147. Id.
148. See Federico, Origins of Section 103, 5 A.P.L.A. Q.J. 87, 88 (1977).
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tion was to bring uniformity and definiteness to the patent system."9
A preliminary draft of the revised patent laws was completed in
1950.11 This preliminary draft included a new section that was intended
as a codification of the "requirement of invention."'5' The new sec-
tion, section 23, contained language strikingly similar to the Supreme
Court's language in Hotchkiss." The only difference was that instead
of talking about inventions reflecting a degree of ingenuity and skill
greater than that of an ordinary mechanic, this new section spoke
of inventions being obvious to an ordinary person skilled in the art."'
The idea though appears to have been the same if a mechanic is defin-
ed as a "person skilled in an art."
During this effort of revising and codifing the patent laws, the
Supreme Court decided a case which greatly influenced the actual
revision and codification. The case, Great A & P Tea Co. v. Super-
market Equipment Corp., involved the validity of a patent initially
granted by the PTO for a manual push-pull rack used on grocery
checkout counters."' The Court invalidated the patent because the
majority of the Court saw the device as adding nothing to the total
stock of knowledge."7 In a strong and more specific concurring opin-
ion, Justice Douglas saw this manual rack as nothing more than a
gadget. He therefore thought the claim of invention on such a gadget
was flimsy and spurious. 8 Consequently, he criticized the PTO for
149. See 35 U.S.C. S 103 note (1982).
150. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 81ST CONG., 1ST SESS., PRELIMINARY
DRAFT WITH NOTES, PROPOSED REVISION AND AMENDMENTS TO THE PATENT LAWS, (Comm.
Print 1950) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY DRAFT].
151. See Federico, supra note 148, at 90.
152. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 150, at S 23; Federico, supra note 148,
at 93. See also EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A STATUTORY STANDARD OF INVENTION, supra note
10, at 9-10. The text of S 23 reads as follows:
23. Conditions for Patentability, lack of invention
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not iden-
tically disclosed or described in the material specified in section 22 of
this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and said material are such that the subject matter as a whole
would be obvious to an ordinary person skilled in the art. Patentability
as to this condition shall be determined by the nature of the contribution
to the advancement of the art, and not by the nature of the mental pro-
cesses by which such contribution may have been accomplished.
Id.
153. 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 265.
154. See supra note 152.
155. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
156. Id. at 149.
157. Id. at 153.
158. Id. at 156, 158 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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having had a long history of granting patents on such gadgets."9 He
also criticized the lower federal courts for having allowed this par-
ticular patent in Great A & P to come all the way to the Supreme
Court before being invalidated." In short, the concurring opinion saw
the conduct of the PTO and the lower federal courts in Great A &
P as evidence of what was wrong with the patent system.'1
This criticism of the PTO and the lower federal courts of course
was criticism of their inability to effectively apply the requirement
of invention."2 Given the ongoing concerns and efforts to revise and
codify patent law, the criticism was enough to influence the process,
especially the Drafting Committee,"3 to decide to entirely abandon
or eliminate the requirement of invention from patent law.'" To this
end, the committee purportedly replaced the requirement of inven-
tion with a new requirement of "nonobviousness.' ' 5
C. 35 U.S.C. Section 103 Nonobviousness
1. Origin and Intent - the Inherent Contradiction
The new requirement of "nonobviousness" became section 103
of the 1952 Patent Act.' The idea and intent behind this new re-
159. Id.
160. Id. at 158.
161. Id.
162. The need to look for invention as a prerequisite to patentability under
the requirement of invention, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss, was
still in effect. In McClain, the Supreme Court had abandoned only the need to define
invention. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
163. See Rich, Congressional Intent or Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952, in BNA,
NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 4, at 1:1, 1:6 (1980) (The Drafting Committee was a two-
man committee, one of whom was Judge Rich. The function of this committee was
to make necessary changes in the Preliminary Draft and to come up with a final draft.).
164. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 163, at 1:8 (stating that section 103 was added
in order to get rid of the vague requirement of invention). Judge Rich, who later became
a judge at the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (now dissolved) was a key
member of the Drafting Committee on the 1952 Patent Act.
165. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 163, at 1:8; Rich, supra note 131, at 32 (detailing
how the nonobviousness requirement of S 103 was developed from the requirement
of invention as drafted in S 23 of the Preliminary draft).
166. 35 U.S.C. S 103 (1982).
S 103. Conditions for patentability: nonobvious subject matter.
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not iden-
tically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if
the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and
[Vol. 20
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quirement was to abandon or eliminate the requirement of invention
from patent law."6 7 Although section 103 supposedly represents this
legislative decision and intent to abandon the requirement of inven-
tion, "' the express language of the 1952 Patent Act and the legislative
history of section 103 reflect the contrary. On the question of paten-
tability, the language of section 103 itself together with that of the
other sections of the Act, continued to expressly require that patents
be issued on inventions that are new, useful and nonobvious.1 9
Apparently, the addition of section 103 did not eliminate this express
requirement of invention in the 1952 Patent Act. Furthermore, the
legislative history of section 103 indicates that section 103 was enacted
as a direct statutory provision of the requirement of invention."' The
history also indicates that the section was intended as a codification
of language found in many prior court decisions, notably the Supreme
Court decision in Hotchkiss.1 ' This is therefore an obvious contradic-
tion surrounding section 103.
Section 103 at the same time cannot be a codification of the re-
quirement of invention from Hotchkiss and a new requirement which
abandons or eliminates the requirement of invention from Hotchkiss.
This contradiction is significant because it obviously had to make the
application of section 103 extremely difficult. Above all, it would also
have meant that section 103 did not at all change patent law.1 12 In
other words, section 103 merely attempted to codify the requirement
of invention as it existed then in patent law. In fact, the Supreme
the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having or-
dinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentabil-
ity shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
Id.
167. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 164. See also Rich, Why and How S 103 Came to Be, in
BNA, NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 4, at 1:201, 1:213.
169. See supra note 53.
170. See S. REP. No. 1979, supra note 101, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2397. See also Federico, Commentary, supra note 55, at 19-21.
171. See S. REP. No. 1979, supra note 101, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2397. See also Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (Court concludes that the sec-
tion was intended merely as a codification of judicial precedents embracing the Hotch-
kiss condition.).
172. Section 103 is generally held to have changed patent law in 1952 by mak-
ing the requirement of invention unnecessary. See, e.g., Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip
Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The CAFC has unfortunately adopted this
position. The position that S 103 is no longer necessary is at best questionable given
the contradition in S 103, as well as its history. See infra notes 237-44 and accompa-
nying text.
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Court came to this conclusion in 1966.173 Yet the contradiction cur-
rently persists. 74
Historically, this contradiction stems from the fact that the text
of section 103 is essentially the same as that of section 23 of the 1950
preliminary draft which of course was drafted as a statutory require-
ment of invention. 75 In fact, section 103 was the final version of sec-
tion 23.176 The only significant difference made by the legislative com-
mittee between section 23 of the preliminary draft and section 103
of the final draft was a partial change in title.7 ' In fact section 103
was put together essentially by partially changing the title of section
23 from "lack of invention" to "nonobvious subject matter."'7 8 The texts
were essentially the same. Consequently, it would appear that any
implied differences between the "nonobviousness" requirement of sec-
tion 103 and the invention requirement of section 23 came, not from
any textual difference between the two sections, but merely from this
change in title. Given the contrary intents of these two sections, this
manner of creating section 103 was bound to be contradictory and
confusing. Furthermore, the application of section 103 as a new re-
quirement for patentability was bound to be uncertain and difficult. "9
2. Difficulty in Application -Continued Indefiniteness and Instability
This uncertainty and concern regarding the application of sec-
tion 103 together with the yet unsolved problem of patentability in
fact perpetuated a continued lack of definiteness and of uniformity in
the patent system. Consequently, in 1966, the Supreme Court again
in the hope of bringing definiteness and uniformity to the patent
system,' ° provided some clarification and guidance on how to apply
section 103. The Court provided its clarification and guidance in the
landmark case of Graham v. Deere.8 ' Graham involved the validity
of a PTO-granted patent for an improved spring clamp for use on
173. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
174. See infra notes 241-249 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Federico, supra note 148, at 92-93 (discusses changes in section
103 from section 23).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Note, The Standard of Patentability-Judicial Interpretation of
S 103 of the Patent Act, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 306, 313-23 (1963) (reviews problems faced
by the courts in applying S 103). See also Note, supra note 91, at 986.
180. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 18 (in ruling on S 103 the Supreme Court believ-
ed that strict observance of the requirements laid down here will result in that unifor-
mity and definiteness which Congress called for in the 1952 Act).
181. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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plow shanks. The improvements involved the use of a stirrup to pre-
vent the plow shank from fishtailing, and the inversion of the hinge
plate to avoid undesirable wear. ' The Court invalidated the patent
on the grounds that the improved spring clamp would have been ob-
vious to a person of ordinary skill in the particular field." In addi-
tion, the Court in addressing one of the concerns surrounding section
103, held that section 103 was simply a codification of the "condition"
in Hotchkiss." The Court then restated the Hotchkiss condition as the
requirement that patents not issue for inventions if the differences
between the invention and what was already known were not suffi-
ciently important.8 ' The Court then concluded that the enactment of
section 103 had neither raised nor lowered the standard of patenta-
bility. '
The Court in Graham also established an analytical method for
applying section 103.87 Under this analytical method, the PTO and
the federal courts are required to consider a number of factors when
applying section 103. These factors include: the subject matter of the
patent application, the knowledge that had already been disclosed to
the public about the subject matter, the differences between these
first two factors, and then the prevailing level of skill in the particular
field.88 As an analytical method intended to achieve definiteness and
uniformity, this announcement in Graham contained some serious
flaws. First, the Court did not specify the type of differences which
are to be considered. Consequently, the selection of what differences
to consider was bound to involve discretion and therefore could not
be uniform." The Court also did not provide a logical basis or calculus
for weighing the factors to be considered.8 8 As a consequence, the
PTO and lower courts have been forced to come up with their own
182. Id. at 22.
183. Id. at 25.
184. Id. at 17; see supra note 111 and accompanying text.
185. Graham, 383 U.S. at 14.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 17.
188. Id.
189. As long as the type of differences relevant to the issue of patentability
are not specified, the examination and comparison procedures can easily degenerate
into contests of "can we find any differences." See, e.g., Graham, 383 U.S. at 23 (Graham
attempted and did in fact rely on the "flexing" qualities of its 798 patent arrange-
ment). He did so despite the fact that he had not urged the "flexing qualities" before
the PTO, nor was there any consideration by the Supreme Court of the relevance
of "flexing qualities" to the issue. Id. at 23-24.
190. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. The Court stated the factors that are to
be considered as the background against which to conclude obviousness or nonob-
viousness, but did not provide a calculus for how factors will each affect the ultimate
conclusion.
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rational basis for finding obviousness or nonobviousness. 9' This has
made the application of section 103 very difficult. Perhaps because
it recognized the difficulty in applying this no-logic-analytical-method,
the Supreme Court in Graham warned that application of section 103
was not likely to be uniform.'92
The Supreme Court itself faced the difficulty of applying sec-
tion 103 only three years after Graham. in A,,derson's-Black Rock v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 93 the Court faced the issue of whether a patent
for a combination apparatus for laying continuous black-top paving
was valid. The task under section 103 was to decide whether the com-
bination of elements in the apparatus was obvious or nonobvious. The
Court held the patent invalid on the grounds that the combination
did not meet the test of invention." The combination of elements did
not meet the test of invention because it failed to produce a new or
different result from that produced by the elements uncombined.
"95
Since the issue before the Court was whether the combination of
elements was obvious or nonobvious, the Court's reference to a test
of invention illustrated the difficulty in the actual application of sec-
tion 103. The difficulty was further illustrated by the Court's announce-
ment of what was in effect a new test of patentability,1" though pur-
portedly relying on section 103.
Applying section 103 was not only difficult for the Supreme
Court, it was equally difficult for the lower federal courts and for
the PTO.'97 Consequently the difficulty in applying section 103 had
meantime heightened the long-standing conflict between the PTO and
the courts.19 In the courts themselves, the difficulty led to inconsis-
tent decisions on the same facts and issues." As a consequence of
191. E.g., infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
192. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
193. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
194. Id. at 61.
195. Id. at 60.
196. See generally Dulin, Anderson's-Black Rock Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.:
A & P Revisited, or a Blessing in Disguise, 4 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 28 (1970). The
requirement of new, different or greater results currently is referred to as synergism.
See Note, Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.: Con fusion Between "Invention" and "Nonobviousness,"
6 CAP. U.L. REV. 111, 117-18 (1976).
197. See, e.g., Sayko, The Impact of the Supreme Court S 103 Cases on the Stand-
ard of Patentability in the Federal Courts, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 818, 826 (1967). See
also Kayton, Nonobviousness of the Novel Inventions-35 U.S.C. S 103, in BNA, NONOB
VIOUSNESS, supra note 4, at 2:101, 2:114.
198. See Gausewitz, Brief in Support of Proposed Amendment to S 103 Title 35,
Patents, U.S. Code, 51 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'y 290, 292-99 (1969).
199. See S. REP. No. 275, supra note 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 15-16.
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the heightened conflict and the inconsistencies, the courts had begun
to invalidate a greater and greater percentage of PTO-granted patents
that were challenged before them, thus discouraging desired invest-
ment in the development and commercialization of inventions. 00 This
discouragement of investments, together with the difficulties surroun-
ding the application of section 103 (factors of instability), were a ma-
jor impetus in 1982 for the congressional creation and grant of power
.to the CAFC to bring stability to patent law.
20 1
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
A. Primary Justification and Mandate
In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for theFederal
Circuit (CAFC)211 primarily in response to the instability caused by
the conflicts and inconsistencies in patent law decisions under section
103.0' Although the CAFC was created as part of an overall effort
to improve the federal court system,0 " it was primarily intended to
be a single and expert appeals court for patent matters. Thus it was
given exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. It became the thir-
teenth court of appeals in the federal Court system and replaced the
patent jurisdiction of the other twelve geographical circuit courts of
appeals and of the dissolved Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
20 5
200. See Gausewitz supra note 198, at 293.
201. See Report of Commission on Revision of the Federal Courts Appellate System,
67 F.R.D. 195, 297, 321 (1976). See also S. REP. No. 275, supra note 2, reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 15-16.
202. See supra note 4.
203. The patent law concerns cited as justification for creation of the CAFC
dealt mainly with the application of S 103. These included: the issue of whether ob-
viousness and nonobviousness determinations pursuant to S 103 are questions of fact
or law; the use of a standard of ordinary skill; and lack of uniformity. See supra note
201 and accompanying text. The problem of patentability, on the other hand, was already
a concern long before the enactment of S 103. See supra note 91 and accompanying
text. See also Note, Patents-The Changing Standard of Patentable Invention: Confusion
Compounded, 55 MICH. L. REV. 985, 986 (1957) (the controversies surrounding S 103
"merely added more uncertainty to the already vague and indefinite standard of patent-
ability"); Sayko, supra note 197, at 826 (discussing divergence, nonuniformity and in-
consistency among the courts and the PTO applying S 103). In order to bring stability
or definiteness and uniformity to patent law, the particular problems associated with
S 103, as well as the problem of patentability, must be resolved.
204. See Federal Courts Improvement Act, supra note 1, at S 101. See also
Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More than a National Patent Court,
49 Mo. L. REv. 43, 43-44 (1984); Note, An Appraisal of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 57 So. CAL. L. REV. 301 (1984).
205. Federal Courts Improvement Act S 122-25, 28 U.S.C. SS 831, 1292, 1295
(1982). See also Adams, supra note 204, at 43-44.
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One of the primary objectives of the CAFC specified by Con-
gress is to develop and increase "doctrinal stability" in patent law." 6
The CAFC sees the Congressional directive to achieve this objective
to be a mandate, especially because Congress gave the CAFC the
powers to make accomplishment possible.2 7 The significance of this
mandate is that the CAFC is not bound by past judicial doctrines
concerning patent matters. 8 Furthermore, the CAFC may reconstrue
patent statutes if necessary in order to achieve its objective." 9
However, for the CAFC to achieve its objective of bringing stability
to patent law, it must solve the patentability problem. Therefore in
exercising its mandate, the CAFC must develop or adopt an objec-
tive and definitive test of what is and is not patentable. To do so,
the CAFC must deal also with the application problems of section
103.2 0 Furthermore, it must also develop or adopt an objective and
realistic definition of invention as part of the test of patentability." '
206. See S. REP. No. 275, supra note 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 15.
207. See Federal Courts Improvement Act S 127, 28 U.S.C. S 1296 (Supp. 1984).
The CAFC is given the authority to make rules regarding the order in which
applicable patent law shall be precedent before it. See also Panduit Corp. v. All States
Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In Panduit the CAFC said: "This court
was created, as contemplated by Congress, to achieve uniformity and to reduce uncer-
tainties in [the patent area]. This court thus has a mandate to achieve uniformity in
patent matters." Id. at 1574.
208. The CAFC has already rejected some key Supreme Court doctrines. In
Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the CAFC rejected
the Supreme Court's view of patent rights as monopoly rights, holding instead that
patent rights are ordinary property rights. The CAFC rejected the Supreme Court's
view because "nowhere in Patent statutes is a patent described as a monopoly." Id.
The CAFC has also rejected the Supreme Court's classification and labeling of some
patents as "combination patents." In Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, 721 F.2d
1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the CAFC stated that "it but obfuscates law to posit
nonstatutory judge-created classification labeled combination patents." And in yet one
more example, the CAFC has rejected "synergism." See generally Note, supra note
196; see, e.g., Gardner v. TEC. Systems, 725 F.2d 1338, 1349-1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
209. See Schenck, 713 F.2d at 786 n.3. In Schenck, the CAFC refers to Patent
Statutes and not to Supreme Court prior construction. Id. Another example of CAFC
exercise of power to construe a statute afresh is CAFC's treatment of S 103. The
Supreme Court in applying S 103 in Graham, 383 U.S. at 1, had read it as requiring
that "differences" between subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art,
be obvious. Id. at 24. The CAFC has rejected this view, and insists that proper inter-
pretation requires that "the subject matter as a whole," not just the "differences,"
be obvious. See, e.g., Schenck, 713 F.2d at 785 (effort to limit focus of inquiry to dif-
ferences from prior art and then show that differences would have been obvious is
not proper under statute which requires that invention be considered as a whole).
210. See supra note 203.
211. The functional relationship of the PTO and the federal courts in the pa-
tent system, is such that a subjective test of patentability will not be effective. See
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B. Section 103 Nonobviousness Under the CAFC-
the Suggestion Test
Section 103 (nonobviousness) has the force of statute therefore
the federal courts including the CAFC must apply it until it is
repealed. The CAFC in applying section 103 has already adopted the
analytical framework laid out by the Supreme Court in Graham v.
Deere.2 Because this analytical framework provided no logical basis
for reaching the conclusion of obviousness or nonobviousness," 3 the
CAFC has been forced to adopt a logical basis. The basis or test that
the CAFC has adopted and is currently using, can be fairly described
to be a suggestion test.214
This suggestion test involves an examination of the claims
in a patent application and the knowledge that has already been
disclosed on the particular subject covered by the patent application.
The purpose of the examination is to reveal whether or not the
knowledge in the claim 15 being examined is "clearly present""2 6 or
"clearly suggested""2 7 by what had already been disclosed on the par-
ticular subject covered by that claim. If the knowledge in the claim
under review is "clearly present" or "clearly suggested," the court
concludes that the claim is obvious. If all the claims are obvious, the
court then denies or invalidates the patent in issue. On the other hand,
if the knowledge in the claim is "not clearly present" or "not clearly
suggested" by what had already been disclosed, the conclusion is that
the claim is nonobvious. The patent is then ruled to be valid to the
extent of such nonobvious claims. Under the suggestion test, the court
supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text. The ineffectiveness of S 103 in fact is due
to this functional relationship and to the fact that S 103 lacks objective criteria on
which the PTO and the courts can exercise judgment consistently. See Federico, Com-
mentary, supra note 55, at 23.
212. See generally Stratoflex v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
213. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
214. The suggestion test is an analytical procedure, based perhaps on a literal
reading of S 103. Section 103, of course, is supposed to cover inventions that are "not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102." See supra note 166. It
is an examination of the prior art (that is, prior disclosed knowledge and know-how)
to see if it already includes what an application or patent at issue is seeking to disclose.
Stated another way, the proper test is whether the prior art references taken as a
whole would suggest the invention to one of ordinary skill in the art. See Milliken
Research Corp. v. Dan River, Inc., 739 F.2d 587, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The suggestion
test is, however, not coextensive with a complete test of patentability. The test operates
to resolve only the issue of knowledge or know-how that is to be disclosed.
215. See supra note 57.
216. See, e.g., In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 995 (Fed. Circ. 1983).
217. See, e.g., Vandenburg v. Diary Equipment Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); White v. Jeffrey Mining Machinery, 723 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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uses a person of ordinary skill in the art as the standard for deter-
mining what is or is not "clearly present" or "clearly suggested"."8
On its face, the approach of this test poses no apparent problems.
However, the fact that the test merely functions to reveal whether
or not the knowledge in the claim under review was already disclosed,
poses a real problem. By functioning as such, the suggestion test in
fact operates merely as a test for disclosure." 9
C. The Suggestion Test Reduces Section 103 Conclusions to Mere
Dicta
Since the suggestion test operates in fact as a mere test for
disclosure, its use as a logical basis for section 103 is clearly prob-
lematic. The problem lies in the fact that use of such a test under
section 103 in effect reduces the conclusions of obviousness or nonob-
viousness to nothing more than dicta. This is because the primary
purpose for issuing a patent is to encourage disclosure" ° of the new
knowledge or technical know-how represented by an invention. The
essence of disclosure in patent law is such that the PTO and the courts
should never issue a patent if the subject matter of an application
has no such new knowledge or technical know-how to disclose.22" '
Accordingly, if prior disclosure was the only patentability issue left
to be decided in a particular case, 2 applying the suggestion test
(to reveal whether or not there was prior disclosure) should
automatically and directly determine the issue of patentability. With
patentability thus determined, subsequent conclusions are mere dicta
218. See Milliken Research, 739 F.2d at 602 (suggestion is to one of ordinary
skill in the art).
219. Note that the suggestion test as applied by the CAFC has in effect altered
the sense of S 103. The effect of the suggestion test on S 103 can be illustrated by
restating the text of S 103 as follows:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the dif-
ferences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been clearly
suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art, by the prior art at the
time the invention was made.
Compare this to the actual text of S 103, supra note 166, and it becomes clear that
the suggestion test has turned S 103 into a mere subsection of S 102.
220. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
221. The contractual view of "patent protection-for-disclosure" also tends to
support this argument. See supra note 68. The lack of something new to disclose would
be seen as a failure of consideration and therefore no patent should issue.
222. For other patentability issues or requirements, see 35 U.S.C. SS 101-04
(1982).
223. 740 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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if they purport also to determine patentability. Similarly, since the
objective of the CAFC is to determine patentability, deciding that
there had been prior disclosure (given the disclosure essence of pa-
tent law) should be determinative. Such determination should render
a subsequent conclusion of obviousness under section 103 irrelevant.
Conclusions of obviousness when made following an application of the
suggestion test, are subsequent to a decision finding prior disclosure,
and are therefore nothing more than dicta.
This effect of the suggestion test on section 103 conclusions is
illustrated in Vandenburg v. Dairy Equipment. 3 The issue in Vanden-
burg involved the validity of a patent for a plastic arm support for
milk hoses during milking operations. The arm support was designed
with a ball and socket joint. ' Applying the suggestion test, the CAFC
came to the conclusion that the prior art clearly suggested the ap-
plication of adjustable ball and socket joints to milk hose supports. 5
Given the disclosure essence of the patent system, this conclusion
should have decided the patent validity issue. The patent should have
been declared invalid given such prior disclosure. Instead, the CAFC
proceeded to draw a further conclusion. The CAFC further concluded
that given the clear suggestion in the prior art, it would have been
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to do what the patentee
did." On the issue of validity, this further conclusion of obviousness
was clearly unnecessary and irrelevant; it was therefore dictum.
Similarly, in White v. Jeffrey,' the further conclusion of obvious-
ness was dictum because it followed a decisive conclusion of prior
disclosure. In White v. Jeffrey, an infringement action, the patent
under review was for a helical mining machine and included sev-
eral claims. In declaring claim 12 invalid, the CAFC said: "Thus
the prior art clearly suggests the claimed combination." 8 Then the
CAFC went on to conclude, "[a]ccordingly we hold that the jury could
not reasonably have concluded that the invention defined by claim
12 was nonobvious."
Another illustration of how CAFC use of the suggestion test
reduces section 103 conclusions to dicta occurred in In re Sernaker".
In this case which involved a patent application for a method of mak-
224. Id. at 1563.
225. Id. at 1568.
226. Id.
227. 723 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
228. Id.
229. 702 F.2d 989 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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ing an embroidered emblem, the CAFC expressly stated the relation-
ship it sees between the suggestion test and section 103 conclusions.'
In reversing a PTO Board of Appeals rejection of the patent applica-
tion on grounds of obviousness, the CAFC said, "[ilf [the suggestion
test] is not met, the invention claimed would not have been obvious
from the references."'" The court also stated the relationship different-
ly when it said, "[i]n the absence of [clear] suggestions, claims would
not have been obvious."' In other words, the conclusion of obviousness
can be drawn only subsequent to and from a finding of prior disclosure.
It is difficult to see from these illustrations how the subsequent
conclusion of obviousness or nonobviousness was necessary or rele-
vant in determining the issue of patentability. Given the disclosure
essence of patent law, the suggestion test decision regarding disclosure
(albeit nonidentical disclosure), obviously and logically should have
determined the issue of patentability. As such, subsequent conclusions
of obviousness were in effect reduced to mere dicta.
The reduction of section 103 conclusions to dicta should be a
significant concern because under current patent law, the question
of prior disclosure is covered expressly by the provisions of section
102." These provisions existed concurrently with the requirement of
invention which section 103 is held to have eliminated. Section 103
therefore should have been more than a mere disclosure provision.
The legislative history and intent of section 103 also indicate that
section 103 was meant to be more than merely another disclosure pro-
vision of the current Act. Yet as illustrated in these examples, CAFC
use of the suggestion test under section 103 has the unintended effect
of converting section 103 into a mere disclosure provision.2 3' As such,
it is difficult to see how section 103 can ever eliminate the require-
ment of invention from patent law.23
230. Id. at 995.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 996.
233. See 35 U.S.C. S 102(a) (b), (d), (e), (g) (1976).
234. See supra note 164-79 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
236. The disclosure requirements or conditions of S 102 are as old as all of
patent law. See, e.g., Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117, 119-120 (1836-1845). Prior publica-
tion, prior patenting or disclosure to the public were grounds for denial of patent
grant. These provisions have been part of patent law since. The requirement of inven-
tion as reiterated by the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, was necessary
despite these provisions. Therefore if all S 103 (which was added in 1952) can do is
restate one or more of these provisions-then it cannot by so doing obviate the need
to define and look for invention as a prerequisite to patentability.
[Vol. 20
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D. The Requirement of Invention Under the CAFC Persists
Despite Section 103
By relying on section 103 and the suggestion test, the CAFC
apparently has had no need to define invention. In fact in a number
of decisions, the CAFC has instead stated that invention is an amor-
phous concept. 3? In the same decisions, the CAFC has also taken the
position that invention is no longer required in deciding what is and
what is not patentable. 38 This the court claims, is because the enact-
ment of section 103 (nonobviousness) made the requirement of inven-
tion unnecessary."' The position of the CAFC in these cases of course
reflects the statutory intent of section 103.2' 0 However, a fair reading
of the patent and copyright clause of the Constitution and of the
express language of the 1952 Patent Act itself, make the position
highly questionable.
Since the patent and copyright clause of the Constitution which
controls and limits the determination of patentability can be recog-
nized or fairly interpreted as containing the concept of invention,24'
"invention", however defined, must be a requirement in determining
what is and is not patentable. Therefore if section 103 (nonobviousness)
is being applied not as defining the constitutional concept of inven-
tion but as making its requirement unnecessary,2 2 section 103 will
in effect be attempting to alter the Constitution. Such a use of sec-
tion 103 is highly questionable because Congress simply cannot alter
the Constitution by legislation.243 In fact, Congress must legislate
within the limitations of the Constitution because Congressional power
to legislate derives from the Constitution. "
The CAFC's position that invention is no longer required in
deciding the issue of patentability is also questionable for another
reason. The position is clearly contradicted when the CAFC, in accor-
237. See Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1540.
238. See Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 714 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
239. See Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1540.
240. See supra notes 164-79 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 18 and 84.
242. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
243. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920) (holding in reference to Con-
gressional attempts to alter the meaning of the 16th Amendment requiring taxation
of income).
244. Id. With specific reference to patent law, the Supreme Court has also
stated that the Congress acts under restraints imposed by the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950);
Graham v. Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
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dance with patent practice," 5 requires that the claims of each patent
application define the invention.4 Furthermore, the CAFC like the
Supreme Court, views the claims of a patent application as defining
and measuring what the applicant regards as his invention." The posi-
tion is also contradicted by the fact that the CAFC also recognizes
the claim element of a patent application as a statutory requirement
prescribed for the purpose of making the applicant define his inven-
tion. 4 ' If patent applicants are thus required to define their inven-
tions with the claims they draft, it is difficult to see how invention
at the same time is no longer a prerequisite to patentability. Since
the CAFC's position is not only contradicted by this practice but is
also Constitutionally questionable, it is reasonable to conclude instead
that proof of invention is still a prerequisite to determining paten-
tability. In other words, it is reasonable to conclude that the need
to define and to look for invention249 as part of the process of deter-
mining patentability has persisted despite the enactment of section
103, and despite CAFC reliance on the suggestion test. From this per-
sistence and from the current concerns raised by section 103 it is also
reasonable to conclude that the CAFC has not as yet (1) resolved the
problems surrounding the application of section 103, and (2) solved
the problem of patentability.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE PATENTABILITY PROBLEM
A. Repeal of Section 103 as a First Step Is Urged
As a first step towards an effective solution to the problems of
uncertainty and instability surrounding the determination of paten-
tability, Congress is urged to repeal section 103. Reasons for urging
the repeal include the inherent contradictions created by section 103,
the effect of the suggestion test on section 103 conclusions and the
constitutionality issue raised by the application of *ection 103. The
245. See, e.g., White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886) (Supreme Court rejected
claims for a canning method of preserving the color and flavor of shellfish because
they did not accurately describe the invention). See also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible-
Top, Inc., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961) (claims are statutory requirement to define and
measure invention).
246. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
247. See, e.g., Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
248. Raytheon, 724 F.2d at 957.
249. It is possible that when patent claims are required to define and measure
invention, the term invention is not being used in the same sense as elsewhere in
the patent acts. Even so, there is still a need to define both uses in order to distinguish
them.
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purpose of section 103 since 1952 has been to bring definiteness and
uniformity to patent law.2" Congressional creation of the CAFC in
1982 for this same purpose, was evidence that section 103 had been
ineffective. More importantly, repeal of section 103 is urged because
CAFC perception of section 103 as having made the requirement of
invention unnecessary is not only constitutionally questionable; it is
contradicted by patent law language and patent law practice. Further-
more, an effective solution to the problems surrounding the deter-
mination of patentability cannot ignore the fact that the requirement
of invention and hence the need to define invention, have persisted
in spite of section 103. It should also be noted that the justification
for section 103 arose from the Supreme Court's inability to objective-
ly and realistically define the concept of invention as it is used in
patent law. 5' Therefore, there will be and should be no further need
for section 103 if and when such a definition of invention is developed.
Currently, development of such a definition of invention is possi-
ble despite claims by the CAFC that the concept of invention is amor-
phous. These claims by the CAFC, unfortunately, are based on the
Supreme Court's conclusion in McClain that the concept of invention
cannot be defined."' This conclusion by the Supreme Court involved
250. See supra note 4.
251. See supra notes 164-69. According to Judge Rich, it was the inability
of the Supreme Court to define invention as exemplified by its decision in Great A.
& P., that justified the decision to adopt "nonobviousness" instead. See Rich, supra
note 163, at 1-6. The criticism of the rest of the patent system by Justice Douglas regard-
ing the inability at properly applying the standard of invention was also a factor. See
supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
252. The view of invention abandoned in McClain was the Hotchkiss view of
invention. See supra note 129. In Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745
F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the CAFC stated, "[invention has been intended as a
discussion of that former prerequisite to patentability known as the requirement of in-
vention which had existed in the law since Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850)."
In McClain, 141 U.S. at 427, the Supreme Court asserted and has maintained that
invention cannot be defined. But see Potts, The Definition of Invention in Patent Law,
7 MODERN L. REV. 113 (1944). In warning against absolute statements to the effect
that "invention" cannot be defined, Potts stated that:
... it is very important to decide whether [this inability to define inven-
tion] is due to our failure so far to have discovered the appropriate defini-
tion of some entity which is capable of definition by further research,
or to an inherent impossibility of definition. It is one thing to define a
philosopher as a blind man searching in a dark room for a black cat-
more delicate instruments may enable him to succeed. It is another thing
to say that the black cat is not there.
Id. at 119. Modern knowledge about R&D and R&D practices may be regarded'as
representing the "delicate instruments" that Potts spoke of, because it can enable
us to succeed.
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its Hotchkiss view of invention. Besides appearing amorphous to the
CAFC, this particular view of invention as argued, is subjective, in-
accurate and inappropriate for patent law purposes." Other views
of the concept of invention, that is, views that are objective, realistic
and hence not amorphous, of course exist.' Further, the current R&D
practice of systematically developing actual inventions255 should also
teach us that the concept of invention is not amorphous. It should
be noted too that the Hotchkiss view of invention was fornulated at
a time when the practices of R&D were still very crude and unorganiz-
ed.2" Today however the growth and sophistication of R&D has taught
us much more about the invention process and about actual inven-
tions."' The patent system, notably the CAFC, can overcome the dif-
ficulties of understanding and defining invention simply by looking
beyond patent law to the world of R&D. Developing an effective solu-
tion to the problems surrounding the determination of patentability
doubtlessly requires an understanding of R&D in addition to the adop-
tion of an objective and realistic definition of invention.
B. A Research and Development Definition of Invention
Is the Key
1. The Process of Invention As a Source of Information
It is generally recognized that law in one respect is an attempt
through the use of words to influence and structure the realities of
human behavior in some context of society.M As such, attempts to
explain or find the real meaning of a word used in law must look
beyond the law itself to the societal context in which the particular
law was designed to operate.! 9
In the case of patent law, this societal context is represented
by organized R&D."'0 The development of actual inventions is part
253. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 115.
255. See infra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
256. Research and Development, or R&D, did not become a profession until
about 1833. See, e.g., L. REDMAN & A. MORY, THE ROMANCE OF RESEARCH 54 (1933).
Even then, the specialized sciences from which much of the current knowledge about
R&D has come, did not really begin to take root until about 1850. Id. As a result
organized R&D as we know it today did not start until about 1901-02. See, e.g., L.
SILK, supra note 7, at 54.
257. See supra notes 40-45; see infra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g, Stroup, Law and Language: Cardozo's Jurisprudence and Wittgen-
stein's Philosophy, 18 VAL. U.L. REV. 331, 331 (1984).
259. See, Halpin, The Limitations of a Legal System, 26 JURID. REV. 29, 53 (1981).
260. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980). In this case,
the Supreme Court saw the patent laws as promoting research efforts. In indicating
[Vol. 20
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of the reality of human behavior in R&D. For the purpose of develop-
ing such inventions, R&D has evolved a sophisticated, systematic and
repeatable process.' Attempts to define invention, that is, attempts
to explain or find the real meaning of the concept of invention as
used in patent law, should therefore look beyond patent law to this
R&D process.
Although there is no ready definition of invention in R&D that
will satisfy patent law needs, this R&D process of developing inven-
tions actually contains the basic and necessary information for such
a definition. This particular R&D process is based on the scientific
method," 2 and has even been acclaimed as the greatest invention of
the nineteenth century."3 As a process, it consists essentially of four
steps."4
Conceptually, the four steps can be described as follows: (1)
recognizing, defining and analyzing a need or want in society; (2) over-
coming a "problem" by searching, generating and evaluating necessary
abstract knowledge (yet unknown to the society), or conceptualizing
and verifying a yet unknown method for applying the abstract
knowledge; (3) designing and developing a product or process that em-
bodies the method of application; and (4) testing and insuring
reproducibility of the product or process.25 Each of these steps in the
its clear recognition of the R&D-patent law relationship, the Court stated: "Itihe
large amount of research that has already occurred when no researcher had sure
knowledge that patent protection would be available suggests .... Id. at 317; See supra
notes 31-33 and accompanying text. See also Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J. LAW & ECON. 265 (1977) (recognizes patent law's place in R&D).
261. See D. HERTZ, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH 75-78
(1950). See also D. KARGER & R. MURDICK, supra note 36, at 202, 210-11, 356-58.
262. See D. HERTZ. supra note 261, at 74. The scientific method can be defined
as an exact and precise method of describing or classifying scientific subject matter
so that the subject matter can be repeated and verified by others. If the description
is of an object, it should be possible to reproduce or reconstruct only that particular
object by applying the scientific method. The langauge of such description must be
capable of reproducing or recalling the subject matter with precision and uniqueness.
See, e.g., 12 MCGRAw-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 102-04 (1971).
263. See L. SILK, supra note 7, at 53.
264. D. HERTZ, supra note 261, at 78. See also D. KARGER & R. MURDICK, supra
note 36, at 202.
265. D. HERTZ, supra note 261, at 78. Of course four steps, the steps dealing
with problem recognition and abstract knowledge or method of application require some
comment. The problem step is analyzed further below. See infra notes 271-75 and
accompanying text. The phrase "abstract knowledge" is used in the same sense as
"principle" either of nature or man-made.
To require that the abstract knowledge or principle be previously unknown is
tantamount to requiring discovery. However, the step recognizes that even if the prin-
ciple is not previously unknown, the technique or method of applying it could be. An
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process represents an essential input or requirement of the process
for developing inventions."8 Each such input is also an essential ele-
ment of the invention that is produced by the process.
Two additional elements required for producing inventions by
this process are necessary because of the economic nature of R&D.267
They are (1) timing as first and original developer and (2) the need
to have a potential market or user for the invention being developed.
Because inventions are costly to develop, it is necessary to have a
user for them so that the inventor can recoup his investment.26 In
addition, the need for patent protection 269 imposes risks of preemp-
tion and loss of investment if the inventor is not the first to develop
and apply for a patent. These two elements, although not steps in
the R & D process, are nonetheless essential to the development and
hence the definition of invention.
Of all the elements essential to the development of inventions
by R&D, the meaning and critical significance of the element of a
"problem" require careful understanding." A problem in R&D is
seen as a "gap" in the societal intelligence, or as a "gap" in the
knowledge or know-how that is needed to satisfy some need or want
in society. 7' The term "gap" means that the abstract knowledge or
know-how necessary for the satisfaction of a need, is unknown or not
yet available to the society. As such, only three possible types of prob-
lem situations can arise in R&D. 2
The first type of problem situation exists whenever the abstract
knowledge is unknown and the method of application is also unknown.
in-depth discussion of the R&D process of inventing is however beyond the scope
of this note. The fundamentals of the process are introduced merely to illustrate the
empirical derivation of a realistic definition of invention.
266. Each of the steps represents an essential input in the sense that without
it, the process is incomplete and the expected results cannot be obtained.
267. R&D projects can cost $14 million or more. See, e.g., E. ROBERTS, THE
DYNAMICS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 213 (1964). Also see Marshall, Japan and the
Economics of Invention, SCIENCE, Apr. 12, 1985 at 157, 158 (The Carter and Reagan
administrations are reported to have invested billions of dollars in basic research in
the hope it will improve national productivity. Commentators also criticized United
States performance in applied science and in the commercialization of new knowledge.).
268. E. ROBERTS, supra note 267, at 216. See also supra note 36 and accompany-
ing text.
269. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
270. The significance is best illustrated by the assertion that where there is
no problem (R&D concept of problem), there can be no research. See D. HERTZ, supra
note 261, at 26.
271. Id. at 25.
272. Id. at 20-30.
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The second type of situation exists whenever the abstract knowledge
is unknown but the method of application is known. The third exists
whenever the abstract knowledge is known but the method of applica-
tion is unknown." The situation in which there is an unsatisfied need
in the society, despite the fact that both the abstract knowledge and
the method of application are known, is not an R & D problem situa-
tion." 4 Satisfying a need which exists in society, despite this particular
situation, does not require research or development. This is because
there is "no problem." In other words, there is "no lack of knowledge"
and hence no need for discovery. R&D therefore cannot develop an
invention under these circumstances, because one essential element
is missing. And what is true of the essential element or requirement
of a "problem" is equally true of all the essential R&D elements of
the concept of invention."'
2. Proposed Definition of Invention Using R&D Elements of
Invention
One effective and practical way to define an item or concept is
by combining all its essential elements.2" Knowing all the essential
elements of a concept should be tantamount to knowing its definition.
Thus, given all the essential elements of invention as derived from
the R & D invention process,277 an effective and practical definition
of invention can be formulated.
273. Id.
274. This situation implies the absence of a key input or element of the R
&D process. The situation implies the absence of "abstract knowledge or method
of application previously unknown to society." As such, no research is required. In
fact, it has been asserted that there cannot be research where there is no problem.
See D. HERTZ, supra note 261, at 26.
275. To develop an invention requires all the essential elements represented
by the four steps of the process. An invention therefore cannot be produced from
the process when an essential element is missing. In patent law, the same conclusion
is also demanded when the product or process sought to be patented embodies neither
a principle nor a method of application previously undisclosed. For examples, see Cuno
Engineering, 314 U.S. at 89 (the patent was invalidated because a thermostatically
controlled circuit and a cigarette lighter with a removable plug were already disclos-
ed by the prior art); Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (22 How.) at 265 (the means by which the metallic
shank is fastened was well known and in common use). The operative effect of the
suggestion test leads to the same conclusion. See supra notes 214-19 and accompany-
ing text.
276. The concept of "an address" in the postal system is an excellent example
of a concept defined by all its essential elements. The essential elements of a typical
postal address are: (1) a proper name (first and last forms); (2) a house number; (3)
a street name; (4) a town or city name; and (5) name of country.
277. All the essential elements of R&D inventions can then be stated as in-
cluding: a need or want in society; abstract knowledge previously unknown to the
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To be effective and practical, the definition of invention for-
mulated from the R&D elements of invention, no matter how pieced
together, must contain all of the elements. 8 The definition must also
reflect a recognition of the problem-solution relationships among the
various elements. For example, using the elements of the process of
invention derived above, an invention can be defined as follows.
An invention within a society is the first and original suc-
cessful development of a reproducible product or process
which embodies a discovery either of abstract knowledge
previously unknown to the society or of a method of ap-
plication previously unknown to the society, and which
thereby can satisfy the need or want of a user in the
society."?9
The view of invention represented by this proposed definition
is totally unlike the Supreme Court's Hotchkiss view of invention.2"
This proposed definition does not include the mental attributes of an
individual as elements. Instead it includes only elements of the method
of inventing.281 The proposed definition in one respect is merely an
element-by-element description of the R&D method of producing in-
ventions. Even so, it clearly incorporates the constitutional and R&D
idea that to be an invention a product or process must embody a
discovery." 2 Thus it is totally unlike the attempted definitions of in-
vention that are based on the Hotchkiss view of invention. Consequent-
ly this proposed definition is more appropriate for patent law pur-
poses and can be applied effectively to solve the patentability problem.
3. Patent Law Relevance and Application of the Proposed
Definition of Invention.
Given the repeal of section 103, this proposed definition of in-
vention can be applied effectively towards solving the patentability
problem because it is a satisfactory and realistic definition of inven-
tion. Furthermore the proposed definition complies with the statutory
society or a method of application previously unknown to the society; a product or
process which embodies the method of application; successful testing and reproduc-
tion; and timing as first and original developer.
278. See supra note 275.
279. This definition represents the second view of invention, see supra note
115. This proposed definition of invention is in terms of the elements and characteristics
of the manner or method of inventing. A similar definition, however, is also possible
even if the first view of invention is adopted. See supra note 115.
280. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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requirements of the current Patent Act. In fact each of the elements
in the proposed definition corresponds to at least a section of the Act.
These sections include 101, 102, 112, 115, 282 and possibly others.8 3
The satisfaction of the requirements of each of these sections is
necessary for determining patentability2" even though the sections
are not grouped together under the patentability chapter of the Act."'5
Because the requirements of these sections correspond to the R&D
elements of invention, to satisfy or meet all the requirements of these
sections is therefore to prove invention. And since the additional
statutory requirements that must be satisfied in order for a patent
to issue are merely descriptive of invention,' proof of invention, mean-
283. See 35 U.S.C. 5 1-293 (1982). Each element of the proposed definition cor-
responds to the requirements of at least one section of Title 35 U.S.C. The element
of a "product or process" is required by S 101. The element of "abstract knowledge
previously unknown to society" or of a "method of application previously unknown
to society" is required under 5 102. Section 102 also requires the element of "suc-
cess." The element of "reproducibility" is required by S 112 and the element of "first
and original developer" is required by 55 115 and 282.
284. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. 5 115 (1982). Although this section is regarded merely
as the oath provision of the Act, it expressly contains the element of "first and original
developer". Failure to establish this element, when at issue, is grounds for denial of
patent application. In fact the absence or presence of this element is what is at issue
in interference proceedings. See 35 U.S.C. 5 135 (1982).
285. See 35 U.S.C. 55 80-81 (1982).
286. Section 101 of the current Patent Act reads in part, "whoever invents
or discovers any new and useful [product or process].. .may obtain a patent..." (em-
phasis added). 35 U.S.C. 5 101 (1982). Section 102 in part reads, "[a] person shall be
entitled to a patent unless the invention was ... [already] described in a- .. " Id. 5
102. Similarly Section 103 in part reads, "[a] patent may not be obtained...if...the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made .... (emphasis added). Id. 5 103. The terms "new", "useful" and "obvious"
or "nonobvious" as well as the phrase "[already] described" are adjectival and merely
descriptive of the express but undefined term "invention". Even where the abstract
nouns of "novelty" "utility" and "nonobviousness" are used instead, they are simply
that, "abstract", and cannot miraculously produce a life of their own. See, e.g., Graham
v. Deere, 383 U.S. at 14, where proper use of these abstract nouns indicates that one
must speak of the utility of something; the novelty of something; and the nonobviousness
of something.
This something is the subject matter sought to be patented or subject matter as
a whole, which from the point of view of inventors, is invention. See Brewer, supra
note 18, at 55-57 (a Ford Motor Company scientist details the seven stages of an in-
vention based on his experience as a member of the Ford R&D team.). See also Red-
ding, On a Clear Day, You Can See the Patent Office: An Inventors View, INTECH. Oct.
1984, at 33, 36 (a scientists describes his invention of a gas detector to other inven-
tors). These articles make it clear that scientists and inventors work on developing
inventions; they do not work on developing novelty or utility or nonobviousness. These
abstract nouns are merely attributes or descriptions of invention.
It should be noted that an objective and realistic definition of invention such
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ing satisfaction of the requirements of these sections, should be the
central and starting point in determining patentability. Therefore iden-
tifying an invention by applying this proposed definition should be
the central and starting point in determining patentability.
Furthermore, applying the proposed definition will be logical and
objective and should enable the PTO and the courts to effectively
determine and agree on what is and is not patentable. The applica-
tion should involve only a logical straight-forward examination of
patent applications for the reasonable absence, presence, identity or
nonidentity of elements.287 In addition, this examination process will
be objective and uniform because the PTO and the courts will examine
the same elements each time and in each case.2 Such objectivity and
uniformity should make it easy for patent applicants, the PTO and
the courts to agree more consistently on what is and is not patent-
able."9 Agreement on this issue is of course the most critical factor
to stability in patent law. The CAFC in exercising its mandate to
bring stability to patent law is therefore urged to look beyond patent
law to R&D. From the understanding of R&D it gains, it should either
develop or adopt a definition of invention such as the one proposed
in this note.
VI. CONCLUSION
United States Patent law and policy stem from and are limited
by the Constitution of the United States through the patent and
copyright clause. This clause requires that patents be granted inven-
tors for their discoveries. The use of the term inventors in this clause,
is significant because it clearly raises the concept of invention to a
constitutional level. The history of the patent and copyright clause
also supports this conclusion. The use in the patent and copyright
clause of the term discoveries with reference to inventors is also very
significant. Such a use is strong evidence of a recognition of the in-
herent relationship between the inventions of inventors, and the
discoveries of inventors - namely that the inventions embody the
discoveries. Additionally, Congress interpreted this clause to mean
as that proposed here, already incorporates these descriptions. Their continued use
as descriptions of invention may therefore be redundant and illogical, especially since
by definition, an invention in this context cannot be old, useless or previously dis-
closed. See supra notes 115 and 279 and accompanying text.
287. This was illustrated using the element of "abstract knowledge" or method
of application. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 272-79 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 211.
290. See supra notes 18 and 84.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 [1986], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol20/iss3/8
DEFINITION OF INVENTION
that patents are to be granted for the inventions of inventors, not
the discoveries of inventors.'
The patent and copyright clause also limits the grants of patents.
It does so by requiring that the grants be for the purpose of pro-
moting progress in science and technology. Today, the promotion of
science and technology (an activity which involves the making of
discoveries as well as the development of inventions) is the function
of R&D." 1 The structuring of R&D into basic research which makes
discoveries, and applied research which develops the discoveries into
inventions, is also strong and practical evidence of the inherent rela-
tionship between invention and discoveries."2
However, Congress has enacted patent acts which do not clearly
evidence an understanding or recognition of this inherent relation-
ship between inventions and discoveries.13 The patent acts without
defining invention, have basically required that patents be granted
for certain types of inventions."4 In addition to enacting these acts,
Congress also created a system for developing and applying patent
law. This system today includes inventors, the PTO, and the federal
courts."'5 Inventors are interested in the system because it protects
the economic interests in their inventions and discoveries. The United
States Government is interested in the system because it helps in-
sure continued economic growth through investment and progress in
science and technology.'
These interests of the United States Government in the patent
system can be served effectively only if the patent system is stable
and reliable. The same is true of the interests of inventors. The
reliability and stability of the patent system depends squarely on the
ability of the PTO and the courts to effectively determine and agree
on what is and is not patentable.
Determining what is and is not patentable has been a problem
in the patent system since 1790. The efforts since then have been
directed at finding a solution. In 1850 the United States Supreme
291. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. S 100 (1982). The term invention is defined as or equated
to discovery. Although it is possible to discover an invention, that is, accidentally stumble
on it without going through all the steps in the invention process, invention and
discovery are not identical even in this context.
294. See supra notes 18 and 286 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 78.
296. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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Court correctly recognized that because the Constitution and the pa-
tent acts contained a requirement of invention, 7 an effective solution
required a definition and proof of invention.' Unfortunately, the Court
at that time adopted a view of invention that was inaccurate and in-
appropriate for patent law purposes.' For invention, the Court in-
stead looked to the mental powers and skill of the patent applicant
and not to the elements and functional characteristics of the product
or process sought to be patented."'0 Consequently, the Court's efforts
to define invention proved unsuccessful and were finally abandoned
in favor of section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act.
Section 103 was enacted not only in order to obviate the need
to define invention, but also to solve the problem of patentability and
thus bring definiteness and uniformity to patent law. However, because
of the alogical nature of section 103, its application has been difficult
and nonuniform. 1 Currently, the CAFC (which was created because
of the difficulties with section 103) has been forced by the alogical
nature of section 103 to adopt a "suggestion test" for use as a logical
basis for applying section 103.3" Ironically, the CAFC's use of the sug-
gestion test has instead reduced the obviousness and nonobviousness
conclusions under section 103 to nothing more than dicta. This is
significant because the net result is that patent law is consequently
reduced to the state it was in before the enactment of section 103
in 1952.13 As such, section 103 could not have and has not satisfied
the congressional intent to bring definiteness and uniformity to pa-
tent law. Furthermore, section 103 has not as questionably intended,
obviated the needs to define invention and to prove invention as a
prerequisite to patentability.?" Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude
297. See supra note 110-14 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 18 and 84.
299. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
300. Such elements and functional characteristics are exemplified by the ob-
jective views of invention discussed in note 115 and by the proposed definition de-
rived from R&D practice.
301. See supra notes 180-97 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 214.
303. The requirement of "nonobviousness" of invention was added in 1952 under
S 103. The purpose was to bring uniformity and definiteness to patent law. See supra
note 149. The lack of uniformity and definiteness sought to be corrected by S 103
had existed in patent law despite the existence of the disclosure provisions of S 102.
See supra note 219. If S 103, under the suggestion test is nothing more than another
disclosure provision, then all we have essentially is patent law as it was before enact-
ment of S 103. The net result of course will be continued lack of uniformity and uncer-
tainty despite the existence of these disclosure provisions.
304. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
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that section 103 has not been, nor will ever be, the objective and
definitive test that can enable the PTO and the courts to effectively
determine and agree on what is and is not patentable. Based on this
conclusion, a repeal of section 103 is necessary and is therefore urged.
In addition, section 103 which was enacted only because Congress and
the courts could not define invention objectively, °5 is no longer
justified because the development of an objective and realistic defini-
tion of invention is currently possible.
Recognition of the relationship between patent law and R&D
as well as an understanding of the R&D process for developing in-
ventions, has made the development of an objective and realistic defini-
tion of invention possible."6 This note has proposed and discussed the
relevance and effectiveness of such a definition of invention. The pro-
posed definition of invention is formulated in terms of the essential
elements required in R&D to develop inventions. Unlike the Supreme
Court's view of invention, this proposed definition represents an ob-
jective view of invention. Furthermore its R&D elements of inven-
tion are consistent with the statutory requirements of the current
Patent Act.
Repeal of section 103 and adoption of such a definition of inven-
tion should resolve the current contradictions created by section 103,
especially the contradiction between the intent of section 103 and the
practice of requiring patent claims to define and measure the appli-
cant's invention2" Further, the application of such a definition of in-
vention will involve only a straight-forward examination of patent ap-
plications for the absence, presence, identity, or nonidentity of
elements2 8 Objectivity and uniformity will be insured by the fact that
305. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 30-33, 260-78 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
308. For example, in Graham v. Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the use of a test
lacking a specified and definitive set of elements, allowed the plaintiffs to argue dif-
ferent factors for validity before the courts from what they argued before the PTO.
Id. at 23. The patent in Graham was for improvements in a spring clamp for plow
shanks. The spring clamp being improved was covered by a patent, United States
patent No. 2,493,811 (the '811 patent). The user of the improvements was therefore
the holder of the 811 patent. The needs that the improvements sought to satisfy were
(1) to prevent the plow shank from wobbling and fishtailing and (2) to prevent
undesirable wear on the upper plate of the hinge device. The abstract knowledge re-
quired to satisfy these needs consisted of the use of a stirrup as a retainer, the use
of a bolt as a fastener and spatial relocation of the upper plate. Id. at 20-21.
Had the PTO applied the element by element definitional approach, it would
have recognized that this abstract knowledge was not embodied in a product or pro-
cess that was to be used in the 811 patent. The element of a "product or process"
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in a given case, the PTO and the courts will be looking consistently
for the absence or presence of the same elements, and by the addi-
tional fact that the absence, presence, identity or nonidentity of
elements can be judged objectively on a reasonable person standard.
Repeal of section 103 and adoption of such an objective definition of
invention are therefore undoubtedly the key to a definitive test that
will be understood by people in R&D, and that will enable the PTO
and the courts to effectively determine and agree on what is and is
not patentable. In short, only a definition of invention that satisfies
the requirements of the patent act and also accurately reflects the
was not proved. In other words the "product or process" requirement under § 101,
among others, was not met. A patent should therefore not have issued. Although the
Supreme Court also came to the conclusion that a patent should not have issued, it
too had failed to recognize that the "product or process" element or requirement was
not present. The Court's conclusion was based instead on the finding that the knowledge
involved in the improvements was previously known to society.
The patent system decisions in this case were as follows. The PTO granted
the patent; the district court found the patent valid and infringed; the appeals court
found the patent invalid and not infringed; and the Supreme Court affirmed the court
of appeals. The differences in these decisions were probably due to the fact that the
PTO and each of the courts looked at different factors or at different aspects of the
same factors. Had each applied the same element by element definition of invention
as a test of patentability, the decisions would probably have been consistent. The
Supreme Court decision in Graham was however correct even though the Court did
not use an objective element-by-element test of patentability.
However, in Funk Brothers v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948), analysis in-
dicates strongly that use of an objective element-by-element test would have produc-
ed a different result. Funk Brothers involved the validity of a patent for a non-inhibitive
compound inoculant for leguminous plants. The non-inhibitive compound inoculant was
needed by farmers and business men. It was made from a discovered but unspecified
non-inhibitive group of Rhizobia bacteria. Prior to this discovery, compound inoculants
produced undesirable inhibitive results because knowledge of or about the non-inhibitive
group of bacteria was yet unknown to society. Id. at 128-31. The PTO granted the
patent. A district court in an infringement action declared it invalid. The appeals court
reversed the district court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court reversed the
appeals court, by finding the patent invalid for lack of invention. Id. at 31. The Supreme
Court's decision was much criticized, and would appear to have been erroneous. Had
an element-by-element definition of invention as a test of patentability been available
to the PTO, the district court, the appeals court and the Supreme Court, the results
probably would have been different.
It would have been clear from use of the objective element by element test
(1) that the non-inhibitive compound inoculant was a product; (2) that there were users
for it; and (3) that the product embodied abstract knowledge previously unknown to
society. See supra notes 277-79. The product was successful in satisfying the need
and was also reproducible. The patentee was the first and original developer of the
non-inhibitive compound inoculant. Had the PTO and the courts looked for the reasonable
presence or absence of the same exact elements, it is more likely than not that they
would have agreed on the issue of validity.
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concepts and realities of the societal context of patent law, can ever
represent the type of objectivity and realism needed by the CAFC,
if it is to succeed in its mandate to bring certainty and stability to
patent law.
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